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Abstract 
This article assesses the development, status and recognition of a prohibition on sexual 
orientation discrimination as a matter of international human rights law. The State practice 
examined appears to reveal fundamental divisions on this issue. The article considers 
whether there are any treaty-based obligations that support the prohibition on sexual 
orientation as an existing right. Having examined the national, regional and international 
human rights jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination, the article considers the 
possible ways forward in policy terms, given the continued opposition from a significant 
body of States. More specifically, it discusses the most appropriate legal and strategic 
responses at national, regional and international levels to manage or bridge the divisions 
between States on the issue. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This article assesses the development, status and recognition of a prohibition on sexual 
orientation discrimination as a matter of international human rights law.1 Supporters of the 
prohibition on such discrimination have sought to subsume it within established human 
rights - such as non-discrimination, privacy, family, expression and association – and 
within established human rights procedures and institutions.2 Opponents of the prohibition 
have, to various degrees, rejected these arguments. They see the prohibition as a ‘new’ 
                                                 
* Professor of International Human Rights Law, University of Nottingham. 
1 See also Sanders, ‘Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in International Law’ (2002) 25 
International Journal of Public Administration 13; Kirby, ‘Sexuality and International Law: The 
New Dimension’ (2014) European Human Rights Law Review 350.  
2 This article does not specifically deal with gender identity issues but many of the arguments 
presented would also apply in that context. See McGill, ‘SOGI….So What? Sexual Orientation, 
Gender Identity and Human Rights Discourse at the United Nations’ (2014) 3 Canadian Journal 
of Human Rights 1. 
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additional right to which they have not and are not going to consent.3 Approached from a 
positivist perspective, State practice appears to reveal fundamental divisions on this issue. 
It is submitted that the variations in State practice are such that there is no credible 
argument for such an existing prohibition as a matter of general or universal customary 
international law. There is either no customary rule or there are a very large number of 
persistent objectors.4 There is stronger evidence for regional customs, for example in 
Western Europe. However, as we shall see, within any wider European region there are 
significant dissenters.  
The focus in this article is on whether there are any treaty-based obligations that 
support the prohibition on sexual orientation as an existing right. It considers how the 
interpretation and application of that right by various human rights bodies has 
accommodated the significant legislative and judicial practice from States - including many 
which are parties to the relevant treaties – and strong public opposition in many States, 
particularly linked to tradition, culture, religiosity and relative poverty, that is clearly 
inconsistent with such an interpretation and application. The widespread and significant 
opposition from States to this normative rise of the prohibition of sexual orientation 
discrimination has created a situation in which there is a very serious tension between what 
is asserted to be clear international human rights law and what are the practices of a large 
number of States from all regions of the world and marked regional differences. States 
have not made reservations to any prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination, 
presumably because they considered that the relevant treaties imposed no such obligation 
in the first place.5 Thus the effect of a ‘living instrument’ approach to the interpretation of 
international human rights law has the effect of placing them in violation, regardless of any 
original meaning. Having examined the national, regional and international human rights 
jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination the article considers the possible ways 
forward in policy terms, given the continued opposition from a significant body of States. 
                                                 
3 See Mittelstaedt, ‘Safeguarding the Rights of Sexual Minorities’ (2008) 9 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 353. 
4 For the contrary view but citing examples of much more isolated opposition see Clavier, 
‘Objection Overruled: The Binding Nature of the International Norm Prohibiting Discrimination 
Against Homosexual and Transgendered Individuals’ (2012) 35 Fordham International Law 
Journal 385. 
5 In any event the HRC has taken the view that a reservation to the obligation in Article 2 ICCPR 
to respect and ensure the rights, and to do so on a non-discriminatory basis would be contrary to 
the object and purpose of the Covenant, see GC 24 on Reservations, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 
para 9.  
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More specifically, it discusses the most appropriate legal and strategic responses at 
national, regional and international levels to manage or bridge the divisions between States 
on the issue. 
The issues considered in this article are of enormous legal, practical and human 
significance. The fundamental legal and practical issues in play relate to the interpretation of 
human rights treaties in terms of authority to interpret, the scope of obligations, methodology, 
consent, the relevance or otherwise of State consensus and applicability or otherwise of a margin 
of appreciation. As for the human cost, in 2013 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated that 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was ‘one of the great, neglected human rights 
challenges of our time.’6 Report after report on sexual orientation issues, from all regions of the 
world, has evidenced violence, repression, exclusion and stigmatization against individuals on 
the basis of their sexual orientation, commonly grounded in discrimination.7  
Following this introduction, Part 2 examines the rise of sexual orientation discrimination 
within international human rights law. Part 3 examines developments within the UN human 
rights systems, whilst Part 4 examines developments in the regional human rights systems. In 
Part 5 consideration is given to support for and opposition to sexual orientation discrimination as 
a human rights issue at the national level. The evidence relates to a series of critical thematic 
areas – criminalisation of homosexual activities and the introduction of homophobic hate crimes, 
the express prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, Gay Pride marches 
and homosexual propaganda laws, and persecution on grounds of sexual orientation in the 
context of Asylum and Refugees. In Parts 2-5 the predominant focus is international, regional 
and national jurisprudence and legislative developments. Reference is also made to significant 
political, institutional and policy developments as well as IGO, and civil society initiatives. 
Obviously many of these developments are interrelated. Causal links between them need to be 
                                                 
6 UN SG, ‘Message to The Oslo Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity’ (15-16 April 2013), Summary of the Conference and Toolkit, available at 
http://www.hrsogi.org (hereinafter Oslo Conference Report).  
7 See Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against Individuals based on 
their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, A/HRC/19/41, 17 November 2011 (hereinafter 
OHCHR Report 2011); Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States, European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA), Vienna, 2011, available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1759-FRA-2011-Homophobia-Update-
Report_EN.pdf; European Union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender survey, FRA, Vienna, 
2013, available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu-lgbt-survey-results-at-a-
glance_en.pdf; Trappolin, Gasparini and Wintemute (eds), Confronting Homophobia in Europe - 
Social and Legal Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2012).  
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evaluated to provide the appropriate contextualisation of the issues discussed.8 Part 6 considers 
the consequences of the contested status of sexual orientation discrimination as an international 
human rights law issue. Part 7 sets out the possible legal and strategic responses to manage or 
bridge the divisions between States on the issue. Finally, Part 8 offers some concluding 
observations given the current lack of consensus. 
 
2. The Rise of Sexual Orientation Discrimination within international human rights 
law 
 
The emergence or addition of ‘new’ specific issues within the broad human rights movement 
always presents challenges.9 The rise of new rights has been described as complex, contingent, 
and contentious.10 As one human rights issue rises in prominence, other human rights issues are 
necessarily affected in absolute or relational terms.11 Thus discrimination based on sexual 
orientation has presented new challenges freedom of religion and for church autonomy.12 Those 
advocating for recognition of, and protection from, sexual orientation discrimination within 
international human rights law have certainly had their legal and policy successes.13 But as with 
any human rights advocacy movement, there are always setbacks stemming from political and 
social obstacles.14 Historically, advocacy on sexual orientation as a human rights issue 
proceeded by focussing on the interpretation and application of existing substantive rights 
obligations binding on States parties to human rights treaties, rather than arguing for the 
                                                 
8 On the systemic influence of international courts and human rights bodies see Helfer and 
Voeten, ‘International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in 
Europe’ (2014) International Organization 77. 
9 See Roseman and Miller, ‘Normalizing Sex and its Discontents: Establishing Sexual Rights in 
International Law’ (2011) 34 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 313.  
10 See Clifford (ed), The International Struggle For New Human Rights (Pennsylvania: Univ Of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
11 See Johnson, Law, Religion and Homosexuality (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).  
12 See Heinze, ‘Sexual Orientation and International Law: A Study in the Manufacture of Cross-
Cultural Sensitivity’ (2001) 22 Michigan JIL 283; Heinze, Sexual Orientation: A Human Right 
(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1995); Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 
1995); Richards, The Rise of Gay Rights and the Fall of the Birth Empire (Cambridge: CUP, 
2013); Etherton, infra n 292. 
13 See Alston and Goodman, International Human Rights (OUP, 2013) at 220-38. On NGO and 
civil society advocacy on sexual and gender diversity at the UN and the EU see Swiebel, 
‘Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Human Rights: The Search for an International 
Strategy’ (2009) 15 Contemporary Politics 19. 
14 See Altman and Symons, Queer Wars (Cambridge: Polity, 2016); De Burca, ‘The Trajectories 
of European and American Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2012) 60 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1. 
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recognition of new human rights and new human rights instruments.15 This was critically 
important because, to the extent that it was successful, it meant that sexual orientation issues 
could and should be addressed within existing law and by existing human rights procedures and 
institutions,16 rather than arguing for new rights and new human rights instruments.17 The 
implicit assumption was, of course, that identification of sexual orientation issues in a ‘human 
rights’ discourse18 within existing mechanisms and institutions was a necessary, if not a 
sufficient, condition for having a positive impact on the lives of those concerned.19 
Advocacy on sexual orientation discrimination as a human right aligned itself with non-
discrimination campaigns and social movements on the more traditional grounds such as race, 
gender and minorities.20 It then sought to extend that jurisprudence by analogy of reasoning or 
harm.21 Over time, however, efforts shifted to focussing on sexual orientation as a separate and 
distinct ground of discrimination. In this NGO’s have played their part although sustained efforts 
had to be made to persuade national and international human rights NGOs to take on sexual 
orientation issues as part of their agendas.22  
The centre of the debate in normative terms has been whether the treatment of 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation should be considered on a par with established 
                                                 
15 See OHCHR, Born Free and Equal - Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International 
Human Rights Law, (2012), (hereinafter OHCHR Report 2012) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/BornFreeAndEqualLowRes.pdf.  
16 My emphasis. Some view those procedures and institutions as problematic in terms of their 
understanding of sexuality issues, see Roseman and Miller, supra n 9. 
17 See OHCHR Report 2011, supra n 7. Given the political differences between States, the idea 
of a Convention on the Elimination of Sexual Orientation Discrimination appears unrealistic. 
See Morgan, ‘Sexual and Gender Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Framework: 
Towards a Resolution of the Debate?’ available at 
ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/5323/1/DISSERTATION_LMorgan.pdf  
18 On discourse and framing issues see Waites, ‘Critiques of “Sexual Orientation” and “Gender 
Identity” in Human Rights Discourse’ (2009) 15 Contemporary Politics 137; McGill, supra n 2; 
Mertus, ‘The Rejection of Human Rights Framings: The Case of LGBT Advocacy in the US’ 
(2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 1036.  
19 See Kollman and Waites, ‘The Global Politics of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
Human Rights: An Introduction’ (2009) 15 Contemporary Politics 1.  
20 See Chan (ed), ‘Protection of Sexual Minorities Since Stonewall’ (2009) 13 The International 
Journal of Human Rights 121-492; Dotan, ‘The Boundaries of Social Transformation through 
Litigation: Women’s and LGBT Rights in Israel, 1970–2010’ (2015) 48 Israel Law Review 3.  
21 On other analogies see Heinze, ‘Cumulative Jurisprudence and Hate Speech: Sexual 
Orientation and Analogies to Disability, Age, and Obesity’, in Hare and Weinstein (eds), 
Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 265. 
22 On debates with human rights NGOs on including sexual orientation issues see Mertus, supra 
n 18. Particularly important in strategic terms were recognition by Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch as the so-called gatekeepers of the NGO movement, ibid, at 1044-48. 
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grounds such as racial or gender discrimination. To some extent the process of interpretation for 
national, regional and international bodies was easy – human rights are usually stated to apply to 
‘everyone’. Provisions prohibiting discrimination tend to follow the pattern of an open list and a 
reference to ‘sex’ and to ‘other status’. Sexual orientation has then been interpreted to fall in 
either, or both, of these categories. This is seen as an application of the ‘living instrument’ 
approach to the interpretation of human rights treaties and consistent with their object and 
purpose.23 The final step is to argue that discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation can only 
be justified by particularly serious or weighty reasons. As this article will illustrate, international 
human rights institutions, particularly the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-
American Court of Human rights (IACtHR) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC), have 
largely imitated each other’s jurisprudence to reach these results.  
 
3. Developments within UN Human Rights Systems  
 
This Part examines the major developments and in part, the lack thereof, in the UN 
international human rights systems and organizations in order to ascertain the degree to 
which sexual orientation issues have been addressed within existing law and by existing 
human rights mechanisms and institutions. As we shall see, the cross-cutting nature of the 
non-discrimination guarantee means that sexual orientation issues are now addressed across 
the whole range of UN human rights mechanisms.24 
 
(a) UN Bodies and Specialized Agencies 
 
By comparison with some of the regional organizations,25 progress at the United Nations 
has been rather slower and more contested.26 Only in the 1990s was significant attention 
                                                 
23 There have been significant dissents arguing that the ECtHR’s use of the living instrument 
approach has gone too far, as in X v. Austria, infra nn 158, 165. 
24 See OHCHR Report 2011, supra n 7, 36-53. 
25 See Part 4 infra. 
26 See McGill, supra n 2, 9-21; Roseman and Miller, supra n 9, 359-71; Corrêa, Petchesky and 
Parker, ‘Inventing and Contesting Sexual Rights Within the UN’ in Sexuality, Health and 
Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2008) 164; Girard, ‘Negotiating Sexual Rights and 
Sexual Orientation at the UN’, in Parker et al (eds), Sex/Politics: Reports from the Frontlines 
(2007), available at www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/book/index.php; Karsay et al, How far has 
SOGII advocacy come at the UN and where is it heading? ARC International, (September 2014) 
available at http://arc-international.net.  
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directed to sexual orientation issues.27 Since then there have been, and continue to be, 
battles fought by NGOs concerned with LGBT rights to be accredited in international 
organizations and then to get LGBT issues onto their agendas.28 By 2008 a Joint Statement 
on the human rights of LGBT persons sent to the General Assembly, which reaffirmed ‘the 
principle of non-discrimination which requires that human rights apply equally to every 
human being regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity’, had the support of 66 
States.29 However, it was met by a negative formal Response by 57 States.30 No formal 
resolutions were proposed then or subsequently because there has not been enough support 
for the adoption of an official resolution by the GA as a whole. Since 2003 GA resolutions 
on ‘Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’ have made reference to international 
law obligations to investigate killings of persons ‘because of their sexual orientation or 
gender identity’.31 In 2010 an amendment in the Third Committee removing the reference 
to sexual orientation was sponsored by Benin on behalf of the African Group and was 
adopted with 79 votes in favour, 70 against, 17 abstentions and 26 absent. However, in the 
Plenary GA the reference has been reinstated on a vote of 93 for, 55 against, and 27 
abstentions.  
In terms of the practice of the UN as an institution there is some evidence that the 
UN SG’s supportive statements are not just rhetorical and symbolic but that the UN’s 
practice as an institution and employer is consistent with them. UN agencies and organs 
such as UNDP, UNESCO, ILO, WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNAIDS have integrated 
issues of sexual orientation and gender identity into their work.32 In 2014 the UN, which 
has some 43,000 staff, announced that it would globally extend its employee benefits to 
                                                 
27 See Heinze, (1995) supra n 12; Sanders, ‘Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International 
Human Rights Agenda’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 67. 
28 See ‘UN takes forward step on LGBT rights and backward step on sexual and reproductive 
rights’ International service for Human Rights (2 June 2014) available at 
http://www.ishr.ch/news (reporting the 7-6 vote by the UN Committee on Non-Governmental 
Organisations to recommend consultative status to ARC International, a leading NGO working 
to advance LGBT rights and equality).  
29 Letter of 18 December 2008 from Permanent Representatives of eight States to the President 
of the GA, UN Doc A/63/3, at 3 (22 December 2008). See Sheill, ‘Human Rights, Sexual 
Orientation, and Gender Identity at the UN General Assembly’ (2009) 1(2) Journal of Human 
Rights Practice 315. The US originally opposed the Statement but changed its position in 2009. 
See Lau, infra n 83.  
30 See Alston and Goodman, supra n 13, 232-3. 
31 See GA Resn 69/182 (18 Dec 2014), UN Doc. A/RES/69/182. 
32 OHCHR Report 2011, supra n 7, para 3, citing a range of Statements, Reports and Guidelines 
by those organizations. 
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workers in same-sex marriages or other unions in jurisdictions where they are legal.33 In 
September 2015, in an unprecedented joint initiative, 12 UN agencies issued a joint call to 
action on ending violence and discrimination against LGBT and intersex adults, 
adolescents and children.34 
 
(b) United Nations Human Rights Council Resolutions and Debates 
 
The number of references to sexual orientation in reports to the Human Rights Council has 
steadily increased. There has been also been an increase in the number of States who are 
willing to discuss human rights issues in terms of sexual orientation discrimination. In 
2006, at the Human Rights Council, 54 States submitted a Joint Statement on ‘human 
rights, sexual orientation and gender identity’.35 By 2011 a similar Statement entitled 
‘Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity’ was submitted by 85 States.36 That Statement had support 
from every region of the world, including 21 signatories from the Western Hemisphere, 43 
from Europe, 5 from Africa and 15 from the Asia/Pacific region. 94 member States of the 
UN have sponsored a Statement in support of LGBT rights in either the GA, the Human 
Rights Council, or in both. In June 2011, the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 
17/19 on ‘Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity’.37 This was the first 
specific UN resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity.38 The resolution was 
controversial and was only narrowly passed, by 23 votes to 19. Those in support were 
mostly European and Latin American States. The Resolution expressed ‘grave concern’ at 
violence and discrimination against individuals based on their sexual orientation and 
gender identity. It also requested what became the first official United Nations report on 
                                                 
33 ‘UN Widens Its Same-Sex Marriage Policy To Include All Legally-Married Staff’ (8 July 
2014) available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48222#.VDfZ-E10yUk.  
34 For the text see 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16511&LangID=E. 
35 Joint Statement on Human Rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity, 
UNHRC, 3rd Session (2006), available at Arc International <http://arc-international.net/global-
advocacy/sogi-statements/2006-joint-statement>. 
36 For the text see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/158847.htm. 
37 A/HRC/RES/17/19. 
38 There had been references to sexual orientation in resolutions on the death penalty and on 
arbitrary and summary executions. In 2003 a draft UN Human Rights Commission resolution 
that contained a general reference to human rights not being hindered on ‘the grounds of sexual 
orientation’ was defeated by 24 votes to 22. 
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the issue prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against Individuals based on 
their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.39 The Report’s findings formed the basis of a 
Panel discussion that took place at the Human Rights Council in March 2012.40 It was 
remarkable that the Panel discussion was the first time a UN intergovernmental body had 
held a formal debate on the subject.  
However, there was significant opposition to Resolution 17/19. The 19 States which 
opposed the resolution were Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Uganda. Burkina Faso, China, Zambia abstained. The 17 
delegates of UN member States in the OIC,41 who were members of the Human Rights Council 
(47 States), walked out of the Palais des Nations in Geneva in protest.42 Though it appeared only 
Muslim delegates walked out, there was reported to be widespread opposition to what is 
pejoratively described as the ‘homosexual agenda’ at the UN.43 Even within the States that took 
part in the Panel discussion strong objections were expressed. Pakistan, speaking on behalf of 
the OIC, stated that it had consistently and firmly opposed the controversial notion of sexual 
orientation, which was vague and misleading, had no agreed definition and no legal foundation 
in international law. Licentious behaviour promoted under the concept of sexual orientation was 
against the fundamental teachings of various religions including but not limited to Islam. 
Legitimizing homosexuality and other personal sexual behaviours in the name of sexual 
orientation was unacceptable to the OIC.44 Mauritania, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, 
opposed any discussion of the subject of sexual orientation. It claimed that debate on the issue 
would lead to further discord among Member States and undermine the Council’s effective 
response to human rights issues. Attempts to impose the controversial topic of sexual orientation 
were aimed at creating new rights for specific cultural values which would have negative effects 
                                                 
39 A/HRC/19/41, 17 November 2011. 
40 See Summary of the Discussion, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Discrimination/LGBT/SummaryHRC19Panel.pdf.  
41 The OIC represents 57 countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 
42 See Gennarini, ‘UN Delegates Walk Out on Sexual Orientation Panel at Human Rights 
Council’ http://www.c-fam.org/fridayfax/volume-15/un-delegates-walk-out-on-sexual-
orientation-panel-at-human-rights-council.html. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ‘Human Rights Council holds panel discussion on discrimination and violence based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity’ OHCHR Press Release, 7 March 2012.  
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on existing social structures.45 Senegal, on behalf of the majority of the Member States of the 
African Group, reaffirmed the importance of respecting cultural and religious values when it 
came to dealing with human rights issues, and rejected any attempt to impose concepts or 
notions on certain behaviours which did not fall into the internationally agreed set of human 
rights.46 Nigeria, (which in January 2014 enacted a Federal bill banning same-sex marriage and 
criminalizing homosexual clubs, associations and organizations), argued that other States were 
seeking to enforce their cultural values abroad.47 Of the African States that were on the Human 
Rights Council in 2011 only South Africa48 (significantly a co-sponsor of the Resolution) and 
Mauritius voted for the resolution. Burkina Faso and Zambia abstained. The remaining African 
States opposed the resolution. 
It was argued that in the absence of universal agreement to require States to recognize 
sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited grounds for discrimination, no State should 
be compelled to do so against its wishes. Any attempt to force through change in this respect 
would challenge the principles of universality and cultural pluralism and threaten the common 
ownership of the international human rights programme.49 The 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights was cited to demonstrate the 
importance of taking into account national and religious particularities in the context of any 
discussion of human rights and sexual orientation. As is well known, this states: ‘while the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’.50 Homosexuality was considered unacceptable to many States because it conflicted 
with the teachings of various religions and with the cultural and traditional values of many 
communities. Imposing the concept of sexual orientation would breach the social and cultural 
rights of communities concerned.51 Concern was also expressed that drawing up new documents 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa has been notably progressive on 
issues of sexual orientation discrimination. See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v. Minister of Justice (1999) (1) SA 6; Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie; Lesbian & Gay 
Equality Project (2005) ZACC 19; 2006 (1) SA 524. On the complexities of the actual situation 
in South Africa see Altman and Symons, supra n 14, 62-7. 
49 Summary, supra n 40, para 19. 
50 A/CONF.157/23, para 5. 
51 Summary, supra n 40, para 20. 
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or agreements that focussed specifically on the rights of LGBT persons was an attempt to create 
new or special rights and could lead to a splintering of human rights into groups and sub-
groups.52  
Despite the strength of the opposition, like-minded States in the UN LGBT Core Group53 
work strategically to promote the wider recognition of sexual orientation discrimination as part 
of LGBT rights. No Human Rights Council Resolution was obtained in 2013 because of the 
opposition of some States.54 However, in 2014 the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 
27/32 on ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ by a vote of 25 in favour,55 14 
against (Algeria, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Maldives, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) and 
seven abstentions (Burkina Faso, China, Congo, India, Kazakhstan, Namibia, and Sierra 
Leone).56 The Resolution requested the High Commissioner to update the 2011 report with a 
view to sharing good practices and ways to overcome violence and discrimination, in application 
of existing international human rights law and standards.57  
Within the UN Human Rights Council the debate on sexual orientation discrimination is 
now being played out by reference to resolutions on ‘traditional values’ (with which human 
rights should be consistent) and the ‘Protection of the Family’. There is no agreed definition of 
‘traditional values’58 but they have been used, for example, to support bans on propaganda in 
favour of non-traditional sexual relationships in the Russian Federation, in Moldova (repealed in 
2013) and in the Ukraine (the Bill was withdrawn in 2015 in the context of EU criticism and 
deteriorating relations with Russia). In 2012 the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 
21/3, proposed by the Russian Federation,59 on Promoting human rights and fundamental 
                                                 
52 Ibid, para 22. 
53 This is a cross regional group that includes 17 states, the European Union, as well as the 
OHCHR, Human Rights Watch and International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission 
54 See Report of the 24th session of the Human Rights Council, available at http://arc-
international.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/HRC24-Report.pdf. 
55 It is notable that the resolution was led by Latin American States (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Uruguay) and adopted with the support of all five UN regional groups. 
56 ‘Human Rights Council adopts resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity and 
concludes twenty-seventh session’ (26 September 2014), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15109&LangID=E.  
57 Emphasis added. As of June 2016 no further Resolution had been adopted by the Council. 
58 Article 17(3) AfCHPR provides that ‘the promotion and protection of morals and traditional 
values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State’. 
59 For critiques of the Russian-sponsored initiative as targeting core tenets of international 
human rights see UN Human Rights Council: Russia’s traditional values initiative result in 
12 
 
freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind: best practices.60 It 
requested the OHCHR collect information from member States and other relevant stakeholders 
on best practice in the application of traditional values while promoting and protecting human 
rights and upholding human dignity, and to submit a summary thereon to the Council. Even that 
resolution was controversial, being adopted by 25 votes to 15, with 7 abstentions. The resulting 
OHCHR Report in 201361 noted the divergence of views on whether traditional values provided 
the basis and background of universal rights and supported their promotion and protection or 
whether they were misused to justify human rights violations especially with regard to sexual 
orientation.62  
As for protection of the family, UN World Conferences in the 1990s and 2000s had been 
marked by disagreement over references to a diversity of family forms.63 In 2014 the Human 
Rights Council adopted a Resolution on the ‘Protection of the family’.64 Whereas the resolution 
did not define ‘family’, States opposed to the Resolution considered that the reference to a 
singular ‘family’ could be used as precedent to oppose rights for same-sex couples, single 
parents, and other forms of families in future UN negotiations. However, a proposal to add that 
‘various forms of the family exist’ was rejected.65 The same process was repeated for a 2015 
resolution which enjoyed an increased majority: 29 in favour, 14 against, and 4 abstentions. By 
contrast, in April 2015 the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Discrimination against 
                                                                                                                                                             
abuse at domestic level (Norwegian Helsinki Committee Policy Paper) 
http://www.nhc.no/filestore/Publikasjoner/Policy_Paper/NHC_PolicyPaper_5_2014_Traditional
values.pdf; Wilkinson, ‘Putting “Traditional Values” into Practice: the Rise and Contestation of 
Anti-Homopropaganda Laws in Russia’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 363. 
60 In 2012 the Advisory Committee to the Human Rights Council prepared a Study on promoting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of 
humankind, A/HRC/22/71. 
61 Summary of information from States Members of the United Nations and other relevant 
stakeholders on best practices in the application of traditional values while promoting and 
protecting human rights and upholding human dignity (2013). A/HRC/24/22/Corr.1. 
62 Ibid, paras 83-84. 
63 See Saiz,‘Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation – A Decade of 
Development and Denial at the UN’ (2004) 7 Health and Human Rights 48. 
64 Human Rights Council Resolution 26/11 (25 June 2014), 26 in favour, 14 against and six 
abstentions. 
65 The process was repeated in 2015, see Human Rights Council Resolution 29/22 (29 to 14, 
with 4 abstentions). See also ‘Human Rights Council holds panel discussion on the protection of 
the family and its members’ Press Release, OHCHR, (September 2014). 
13 
 
Women published a report explicitly including ‘families comprising lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons’ and ‘self-created and self-defined families’.66 
(c) UN Human Rights Council – Universal Periodic Review 
The basis for UPR are the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the human 
rights instruments to which a State is party, and voluntary pledges and commitments made by 
States.67 It does not involve new substantive human rights obligations. The UPR processes are 
more in the nature of dialogic and advisory systems and do not result in a legally binding 
outcome. The UPR process has been described as offering the ‘most useful space’68 within the 
UN system for systematic discussion of sexual orientation issues and for civil society 
engagement.69 Civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, can submit information as 
stakeholders. Sexual orientation issues have frequently been raised with States during the UPR 
process. This is not surprising because States can choose which issues to comment on during the 
interactive dialogue.70 More revealing can be the responses to recommendations. In 2008, Benin 
accepted 33 out of 34 recommendations made during the UPR process. The one exception 
related to same-sex activities.71 As the UPR process has worked through all UN members, many 
States have openly rejected recommendations to decriminalize homosexuality and legalise same-
sex marriage or adoption.72 However, other States have responded more positively by agreeing 
                                                 
66 ‘Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against Women in Law and in 
Practice’, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/40 (2 April 2105), para. 23. 
67 Resolution 5/1, Institution-Building of the UN Human Rights Council, Annex I, UPR 
Mechanism, at A1.  
68 See Karsay, supra n 26, 11-19; Charlesworth and Larking (eds), Human Rights and the 
Universal Periodic Review (Cambridge: CUP, 2014) 194-6, 219-22. 
69 In June 2015 a ‘Civil Society Joint Statement on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity & 
Expression and Intersex Status’ at the 29th UN Human Rights Council, on behalf of the 
International Lesbian and Gay Association and 13 co-sponsoring NGOs, was endorsed by 417 
NGO’s from more than 105 countries. See http://www.scribd.com/doc/270193193/Civil-Society-
Joint-Statement-on-Sexual-Orientation-Gender-Identity-Expression-and-Intersex-Status-at-the-
29th-UN-Human-Rights-Council-29-June-201#scribd.  
70 See for example, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, A/HRC/26/10 (26 March 2014), paras 31, 37, 42, 80, 91, 97, 
101.13, 101.38, 101.40-46.   
71 A/HRC/8/L.10/Rev 1 (5 August 2008). 
72 See Report of the 24th session, supra n 54, Annex I; Cowell and Milon, ‘Decriminalisation of 
Homosexuality through the Universal Periodic Review’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 
341. 
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to decriminalize or review criminalization.73 Recommendations to more effectively investigate 
allegations of violence against LGBT persons have received a more favourable response. One 
report suggested that, while the overall acceptance rate for all recommendations in the first cycle 
of the UPR (2008-2011) was 73%, acceptance of the recommendations related to recognition of 
sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) related human rights was only 36%.74 From a total 
of 21,353 recommendations to all States in the first cycle, 493 (2.3%) referred to sexual 
orientation and gender identity. Of these 179 (36%) were ‘accepted’.75 These 493 
recommendations originated from only 39 States. 314 (63.5%) of those recommendations 
elicited negative responses in the sense that no meaningful action might be expected. They were 
either ‘rejected’, given a ‘general response’ or received ‘no response’ at all. Of the 78 countries 
that criminalise same sex sexual relations, 19 responded to second cycle recommendations. Of 
these, aside from St Kitts and Nevis that gave a ‘General response’, the other 18 rejected all 
recommendations calling for general non-discrimination and ‘decriminalisation’. However, 5 of 
the 18 accepted highly targeted specific recommendations on aspects of sexual orientation 
discrimination, for example, concerning police violence, education, and impartial 
investigations.76 In 2014, during the second UPR cycle (2012-16), the rules were changed and 
States can no longer reject recommendations. All recommendations that are not accepted or not 
responded to are now considered to be ‘Noted’. In substance the same pattern as in the first cycle 
was evident. As of March 2016, 1110 recommendations were made on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity in the first two UPR cycles. 49 States had raised the issue of  
and 159 States had received recommendations. However, the majority of recommendations 
relating to sexual orientation that have been addressed to States that do not recognise LGBT 
rights have been ‘Noted’ rather than ‘Accepted’.77 Thus of the 1100 recommendation, 703 (some 
63%) have been noted. 
(d) UN Special Procedures 
                                                 
73 Cowell and Milon, ibid at 348-50, discussing Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Palau, 
Nauru, Mozambique, Samoa, Grenada, St Lucia, and Kiribati. 
74 Itaborahy and Zhu (eds), State Sponsored Homophobia – A World Survey of laws: 
Criminalization, Protection and Recognition of Same Sex Love, 9th edn, May 2014, 13, available 
at http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_SSHR_2014_Eng.pdf.  
75 In a positive response to UPR recommendations, Australia introduced federal protections for 
LGBT people in 2013. 
76 State Sponsored Homophobia 2014, supra n 74, 14-15. ARC International publishes a Report 
on each HRC Session, see http://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/human-rights-council/.  
77 See UPR Info’s Database of UPR recommendations and voluntary pledges, available at 
http://www.upr-info.org/database/statistics/index_issues.php?fk_issue=47&cycle=. 
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The UN Special Procedures processes are also of dialogic and advisory systems. Though 
interpretations offered may be persuasive and authoritative, the work of the Special Procedures 
does not result in legally binding outcomes.78 Sexual orientation discrimination issues have been 
increasingly mainstreamed and many of the UN Special Procedure mandate holders have raised 
these issues within the context of their respective mandates.79 The number of references to sexual 
orientation in their reports to the Human Rights Council and in communications to States by 
Special Procedures is steadily increasing, although some States have objected to this practice.80 
However, it is notable that, despite the increasing prominence of the issue, there has never been 
a proposal for a UN Special Rapporteur on the theme of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. There would doubtless be strong political opposition to any such development. 
 
(e) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
The view of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is that ‘[t]he case for 
extending the same rights to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)81 persons as those 
enjoyed by everyone else is neither radical nor complicated. It rests on two fundamental 
principles that underpin international human rights law: equality and non-discrimination’.82 
States and international organizations that support sexual orientation discrimination as a human 
right tend to follow this universal or equal human rights approach.83 The UN SG has stated that, 
‘Where there is tension between cultural attitudes and universal human rights, universal human 
rights must carry the day’.84 In his message to the Oslo Conference on Human Rights, Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity he commented that: 
 
                                                 
78 See Limon and Piccone, U.N. Human Rights Experts: Determinants of Influence (Brookings 
Institute, 2014) available at http://www.brookings.edu/. 
79 See Report of Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief on violence committed in 
the name of religion, UN Doc A/HRC/28/66 (29 December 2014), paras. 11, 34, 42; OHCHR 
Report 2011, supra n 7; International Commission of Jurists, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity in Human Rights Law: References to Jurisprudence and Doctrine of the UN Human 
Rights System (5th ed. 2013), available at http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/SOGI-UN-Compil_electronic-version.pdf. 
80 See, for example, Report of the 24th session of the Human Rights Council, Annex II, available 
at http://arc-international.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/HRC24-Report.pdf 
81 Increasing use of ‘LGBTI’ signifies the addition of intersex persons. 
82 OHCHR Report 2011, supra n 7 at 7. 
83 See Lau, ‘Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality of International Human Rights Law’ 
(2004) 71 University of Chicago Law Review 1689. 
84 Oslo Conference Report, supra n 6. 
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Some will oppose change. They may invoke culture, tradition or religion to defend the 
status quo. Such arguments have been used to try to justify slavery, child marriage, rape 
in marriage and female genital mutilation. I respect culture, tradition and religion – but 
they can never justify the denial of basic rights.85 
 
Applying the approach that sexual orientation issues are covered by existing rights, the 2012 
OHCHR Report, Born Free and Equal - Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International 
Human Rights Law, sets out five core obligations of States with respect to protecting the human 
rights of LGBT persons,86 including: to protect individuals from homophobic and transphobic 
violence; to prevent torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of LGBT persons; to 
decriminalize homosexuality; to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity, and to respect freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. On 26 July 
2013, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights launched a year-long public information 
campaign, based on the 2012 OHCHR Report, designed to raise awareness of homophobic and 
transphobic violence and discrimination and promote greater respect for the rights of LGBT 
people everywhere.87 However, at the Human Rights Council’s 24th session in 2013, Pakistan, 
speaking on behalf of the OIC, said the OIC had consistently raised its reservations about 
‘controversial’ notions that had not been universally agreed, such as LGBT rights, and therefore 
could not support any initiative by the High Commissioner in this respect. Iran also had strong 
reservations about any education campaign on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people 
supported by the High Commissioner on the basis that it would contradict established human 
rights principles. Saudi Arabia stated that the rights of LGBT people were against Islamic 
Sharia.88 Similar statements were made by Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria at the 29th 
session of the HR Council in 2015 after the presentation of the High Commissioner’s updated 
Report on human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 
 
                                                 
85 UN SG, ‘Message to The Oslo Conference’ supra n 6, 32. 
86 See OHCHR Report 2012, supra n 15. 
87 See Press Release, ‘UN Human Rights Office Launches Unprecedented Global Campaign for 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equality (26 July 2013) available at http://www.prweb. 
com/releases/2013/7/prweb10967571.htm. The initiative seems to have come from the OHCHR.  
88 For another context see Osborne, ‘Saudi Arabia insists UN keeps LGBT rights out of its 
development goals’, The Independent, 29 September 2015. This interpretation of Sharia is 
contested by Rehman and Polymenopoulou, ‘Is Green Part of the Rainbow? Sharia, 
Homosexuality, and LGBT Rights in the Muslim World’ (2013) Fordham International Law 
Journal 1; Hamzic, ‘The Case of “Queer Muslims”’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 237. 
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(f) The Human Rights Committee and the other UN Treaty Bodies  
 
None of the UN human rights treaties contain any express reference to sexual orientation. The 
interpretation of those treaties is of critical importance for the large numbers of States parties 
that have consented to be bound by those treaties.89 Both States and UN treaty bodies consider 
that they have authority to interpret treaties but there is no clearly established rule on which has 
the superior authority.90 With respect to the ICCPR, the General Comments and Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), and their Views under the First Optional 
Protocol, are not legally binding but their interpretations are regarded as authoritative both by 
States parties and the HRC itself.91 The same is broadly true for all of the UN treaty bodies.92 
Nonetheless, it has been suggested that it is through the mechanism of treaty interpretation by 
the treaty bodies that the some of the ‘strongest existing explicit protections against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation’ have been achieved at the UN.93 Some of the 
earliest and leading Treaty Body jurisprudence was developed by the HRC under the ICCPR.94 
The HRC interprets the ICCPR on the basis that it is a ‘living instrument’, to be interpreted in 
accordance with its object and purpose.95 However, it does not make any express reference to the 
relevance of State consensus and has explicitly rejected the idea of affording States a margin of 
appreciation in the implementation of the ICCPR.96 In a landmark decision in Toonen v. 
Australia in 1994 the HRC interpreted ‘sex’ in Articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR as covering 
‘sexual orientation’ and thus States parties are obliged to protect individuals from discrimination 
                                                 
89 See Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Human Rights Law, supra n 79, 30-123. 
90 See Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 905 at 908 (noting the differences between courts and UN treaty 
bodies). 
91 See Tyagi, The UN Human Rights Committee (Cambridge: CUP, 2011) 43-4; HRC, General 
Comment 33, The Obligations of States Parties Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 
(2008).  
92 Some of them are more focussed on progressive obligations and the policies and strategies 
adopted by States, rather than having the HRC’s strongly legalistic focus. See generally Keller 
and Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge: CUP, 
2012). 
93 See Kukura, ‘Sexual Orientation and Non-Discrimination’ (2005) 17 Peace Review 181 at 
183. 
94 168 States parties as of March 2016. 
95 See GC 31 (2004), The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to 
the Covenant; Judge v. Canada, Cmn No. 829/1998, para 10.3. 
96 Länsman et al. v. Finland, Cmn No. 511/1992, para 9.4; GC 34, para 16 (on Freedom of 
Expression in Article 19 ICCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (12 September 2011). For the 
ECtHR the absence of consensus would normally lead to States being afforded a wide margin of 
appreciation.  
18 
 
on the basis of their sexual orientation.97 The HRC offered no explanation or justification for its 
interpretation. There was no reference to the drafting history (travaux preparatoires) (even 
though Australia had referred to it), State practice, other human rights treaties, national 
legislation, or any other evidence of State practice. Subsequently the HRC has not sought to 
distinguish its decision in the Toonen case on the basis of the particular moral and social 
situation then obtaining in Australia. Rather its established jurisprudence is that the 
criminalisation of consensual adult same-sex relations violates Article 17 of the ICCPR (right to 
privacy).98 Thus the HRC did not accept that, for the purposes of Article 17, moral issues were 
exclusively a matter of domestic concern.99 Of course, States which criminalize same-sex 
relationships would not accept the HRC’s interpretation that such relationships are part of the 
right to privacy in Article 17.100 For example, the representative from Botswana informed the 
HRC that it viewed same-sex sexual activity as immoral contra bonos mores which the nation 
traditionally held as contrary to traditional and religious beliefs.101 Although it had specifically 
been asked by Australia for guidance on whether ‘sexual orientation’ came within ‘other status’ 
the HRC did not answer the point. However, in Concluding Observations that refer to the 
criminalization of same-sex sexual activities between consenting adults it commonly includes 
reference to both Articles 17 and 26.102 Significantly though, the other UN human rights treaty 
bodies have proceeded on the basis that ‘sexual orientation’ does come within ‘other status’.103  
                                                 
97 Cmn No. 488/1992, para 8.7. See Joseph, ‘Gay Rights Under the ICCPR – Commentary on 
Toonen v. Australia’ (1994) 13 Univ Tasmania Law Review 392; Helfer and Miller, ‘Sexual 
Orientation and Human Rights’ (1996) 9 Harvard Human Rights Journal 61. The UN Human 
Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention regularly cites Toonen in finding the 
detention of homosexuals to be arbitrary. 
98 The HRC has also noted that laws criminalizing homosexuality run counter to the 
implementation of effective education programmes in respect of HIV/AIDS prevention, see 
CCPR/C/JAM/CO/3 (HRC, 2011), para 9 (Jamaica). The CeeESCR has observed that ‘By virtue 
of Article 2(2) and Article 3, the Covenant proscribes any discrimination in access to health care 
and underlying determinants of health, as well as to means and entitlements for their 
procurement, on the grounds of… sexual orientation…’; GC 14, para 18 (2000) on the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health. 
99 Toonen, supra n 97, para 8.6. 
100 Cf the difference of opinion in the UK Supreme Court on whether private life extends to 
photographs of a child’s participation in criminal riots see In the matter of an application by 
JR38 for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) (2015) UKSC 42. 
101 See UN Doc CCPR/C/SR 2515, para 12. 
102 See CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1, para 22 (Botswana) (2008). 
103 See, for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CeeESCR), GC 20, 
para 32 on ‘Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009). 
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As is well known, the HRC has interpreted Article 26 ICCPR as a general, free-standing, 
equality and non-discrimination guarantee which prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any 
field regulated and protected by public authorities.104 This is of crucial importance in this context 
because it means that discrimination based on sexual orientation could be a violation of Article 
26 irrespective of whether the issue concerned is within any other ICCPR rights, such as privacy 
or family life. Thus its scope extends to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
and the HRC has indeed found violations of Article 26 on the basis of discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation in relation to such rights. In Young v Australia,105 decided in 2003, 
and X v Colombia,106 decided in 2007, the HRC concluded that differences in treatment in the 
award of pension benefits to a same-sex partner were a violation of the right to be free from 
discrimination ‘on grounds of sex or sexual orientation.’ In neither case had the State concerned 
put forward an argument that the differences were reasonable and objective.107 States that 
disagree with the inclusions of sexual orientation as within ‘sex’ or ‘other status’ would not 
accept the HRC’s interpretation. Alternatively they would maintain that the distinctions they 
draw on that basis are reasonable and objective.  
The HRC has taken a wide interpretation of the concept of a ‘family’, acknowledging the 
existence of various forms of family, such as unmarried couples and their children or single 
parents and their children.108 If a group of persons is regarded as a family under the legislation 
and practice of a State, it must be given the protection provided for by Article 23 ICCPR. The 
HRC has not expressly determined whether same-sex couples can establish a family life.109 Of 
course, States which do not accept that same-sex couples can constitute a family would not agree 
with such an interpretation in any event. They would also support the interpretation of the HRC 
in Joslin v New Zealand in 2002 which held that States were not required, under the ICCPR, to 
allow same-sex couples to marry.110 Although the State party made repeated references to the 
travaux preparatoires and academic studies, the HRC’s analysis solely focussed on what it 
                                                 
104 Broeks v. Netherlands, Cmn No. 172/1984, para 12.1; HRC, GC 18, para 12; Joseph et al 
(eds), The ICCPR – Cases, Materials and Commentary, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 759-831. 
105 Cmn No. 941/2000, para 10.4.  
106 Cmn No. 1361/2005, para 9. 
107 The decisions were ultimately implemented by legislative provisions in Australia and by a 
subsequent Constitutional Court decision in Colombia respectively. In that sense the HRC’s 
decisions created new advocacy opportunities at a domestic level 
108 GC 19, para 2.  
109 In X v. Colombia, Cmn No. 1361/2005, two individual members argued that they could not 
do so. 
110 Cmn No. 902/1999, para 8.2. At that time only one State in the world, the Netherlands, 
allowed same-sex couples to marry. New Zealand legislated for same-sex marriage in 2013. 
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considered to be the intentions of the States parties, as expressed by the text, rather than a 
purposive or teleological approach. It explained that Article 23(2) ICCPR was the only 
substantive provision in the Covenant which defined a right by using the term ‘men and women’, 
rather than ‘every human being’, ‘everyone’ and ‘all persons’. Use of the term ‘men and women, 
rather than the general terms used elsewhere in Part III of the Covenant, has been consistently 
and uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation of States parties stemming from 
Article 23(2) is to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a woman wishing to 
marry each other.’111 Two members of the HRC took the view that there could be circumstances, 
for example, concerning differences in benefits, where the consequences of preclusion from 
marriage could constitute discrimination.112 
HRC jurisprudence has been strict in its assessment of what constitutes reasonable and 
objective grounds for restrictions on rights based on sexual orientation. In October 2012, in 
Fedotova v. Russian Federation,113 the HRC considered that the State had not shown that a 
restriction on the right to freedom of expression in relation to ‘propaganda of homosexuality’ – 
as opposed to propaganda of heterosexuality or sexuality generally – among minors was based 
on reasonable and objective criteria. Moreover, no evidence that would point to the existence of 
factors justifying such a distinction has been advanced.114 Furthermore, the HRC was of the view 
that, by displaying posters that declared ‘Homosexuality is normal’ and ‘I am proud of my 
homosexuality’ near a secondary school building, F had not made any public actions aimed at 
involving minors in any particular sexual activity or at advocating for any particular sexual 
orientation. Instead, she was giving expression to her sexual identity and seeking understanding 
for it.115 While the HRC recognized the role of the State authorities in protecting the welfare of 
minors, it observed that the State failed to demonstrate why on the facts of the present 
communication it was necessary, for one of the legitimate purposes of Article 19(3) ICCPR 
(freedom of expression) to restrict the author’s right to freedom of expression for expressing her 
sexual identity and seeking understanding for it, even if indeed, as argued by the State, she 
intended to engage children in the discussion of issues related to homosexuality. Accordingly, 
the HRC concluded that F’s conviction of an administrative offence for ‘propaganda of 
homosexuality among minors’ on the basis of the ambiguous and discriminatory section of the 
                                                 
111 Ibid. 
112 Individual Opinion of Lallah and Scheinin. 
113 Cmn No. 1932/2010, (2012). 
114 Fedotova, para 10.6, citing Young v. Australia, supra n 105, para 10.4; and X. v. Colombia, 
supra n 106, para 7.2.  
115 Fedotova, para 10.7. 
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Ryazan Region Law, amounted to a violation of her rights under Article 19(2), read in 
conjunction with Article 26 (equality and non-discrimination).116 
Whilst the HRC has developed some of the most legally significant jurisprudence on 
these issues, it has also been criticised on the basis that its practice in raising sexual orientation 
issues has been inconsistent.117 Issues have been raised with some States but not others. Until 
2014, none of its General Comments had ever expressly referred to LGBT issues. The 2014 
General Comment on Article 9: Liberty and Security of Person,118 was the first to state that 
‘Everyone’ includes, among others, ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons’.119 It 
referred to ‘violence against persons on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity’120 
and to arrest and detention on discriminatory grounds based on sexual orientation.121 
 This section has focussed on the HRC but all of the UN human rights treaty bodies now 
raise sexual orientation issues on a regular basis.122 The Committee Against Torture, the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child have all adopted 
GC’s on LGBT rights.123  
 
(g) The Yogyakarta Principles 
 
                                                 
116 Fedotova, para 10.8. In 1982 in Hertzberg v. Finland, Cmn No. 14/1979, the HRC had 
upheld restrictions on freedom of expression relating to the encouragement to indecent 
behaviour between members of the same sex.  
117 See Gerber and Gory, ‘The UN Human Rights Committee and LGBT Rights: What Is It 
Doing? What Could It Be Doing?’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 403.  
118 GC 35, pr. 7 (28 October 2014). 
119 Ibid, para. 3. 
120 Ibid, para 7.  
121 Ibid, para 17. 
122 See, for example, CO’s of HRC on Mexico (CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5), para 21, and Uzbekistan 
(CCPR/C/UZB/CO/3), para 22; CRC Cee, GC 4 para 6 (2003), GC 13 (2011), para 74; CAT 
Cee, GC 2, paras 20, 21; CEDAW Cee, GR 27, para 13; GR 28 para 18, GR 29 para 24; 
CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/4, para 22 (Senegal); Cee ESCR, GC 22 (2016) on the right to sexual and 
reproductive health, paras 9, 19, 23 and 30. A search of the OHCHR’s Universal Human Rights 
Index in March 2016 for ‘sexual orientation’ found 705 results. In November 2015 the CAT Cee 
held that the refoulement of an LGBT human rights defender would breach the Convention 
Against Torture, JK v. Canada, Cmn No. 562/2013, UN Doc CAT/C/56/D/562/2013. 
123 Roseman and Miller, supra n 9, comment that the ‘ideal functional response to the ad hoc 
aspect of the treaty body jurisprudence could be a joint general comment across the treaty bodies 
on sexual rights’ but conclude that this outcome is unlikely because of the current fragmented 
system, at 373. 
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An enormous range of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) initiatives have been 
undertaken in regional and international governmental organisations.124 In 1995, although 
express references to sexual orientation were ultimately deleted from the Declaration and 
Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women, the issues were placed on the 
international agenda.125 2006 saw the adoption by a distinguished group of international human 
rights experts of the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights 
Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.126 These are not a UN instrument but 
are considered here for convenience because of their intended effect namely to apply existing 
international human rights law standards to address the situation of LGBT people, and issues of 
intersexuality. The OHCHR, UN Special Procedures, UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for human rights have referenced the Yogyakarta Principles. 
Again though there has been opposition from some States. In 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Education presented an interim report on the human right to 
comprehensive sexual education to the UNGA, in which he cited the Yogyakarta Principles as a 
human rights standard. In the ensuing discussion, the majority of members of the Third 
Committee of the GA recommended against adopting a reference to the Yogyakarta 
Principles.127 A reference to the Principles as a source of international law in a section of the 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism128 was criticised in the Third Committee of 
the GA as inappropriate by Tanzania on behalf of the African Group, and by St Lucia and 
Malaysia on behalf of the OIC. 129 Unusually the voting in the Third Committee on the resolution 
                                                 
124 There are an enormous number of very active LGBT NGOs nationally, regionally and 
internationally. The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association is an 
international organization, with a HQ in Geneva, which bring together more than 1100 LGBT 
groups from 110 countries, see http://ilga.org. See also Thorenson, Transnational LGBT 
Activism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 
125 See Helfer and Miller, supra n 97. 
126 See O’Flaherty and Fisher, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human 
Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 
207; Brown ‘Make Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human 
Rights Law’ (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 821.  
127 See ‘General Assembly, Human Rights Council Texts...’, Press Release, 65th GA, 
GA/SHC/3987 (25 October 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/gashc3987.doc.htm. 
128 UN Doc A/64/211, para 48, n 16 (3 August 2009) 
129 See Ettelbrick and Zerán, The Impact of the Yogyakarta Principles on International Human 
Rights Law Development, available at 
http://www.ypinaction.org/files/02/57/Yogyakarta_Principles_Impact_Tracking_Report.pdf at 
15. 
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on Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism was extremely divisive. Its approval 
was secured only after two amendments related to the approach to sexual orientation and gender 
issues were agreed.130 
 
4. Developments within Regional Human Rights Systems  
 
This Part examines the major developments in the regional human rights systems and 
organizations. Again, the key purpose is to ascertain the degree to which sexual orientation 
issues have or have not been addressed as within existing law and by existing human rights 
mechanisms and institutions. 
 
(a) The Council of Europe – Reports and International Instruments 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE), with 47 member States and covering over 820 million persons, 
has taken a leading role in the fight against discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation.131 Its admissions criteria, standards and mechanisms seek to promote and ensure 
respect for the human rights of every individual. These include equal rights and dignity of all 
human beings, including lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons.132 The first CoE treaty explicitly 
referring to non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was the 2007 Convention on the 
Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.133 The 2011 Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence was the first to 
refer to non-discrimination on grounds both sexual orientation and gender identity.134 In 2010 
the Committee of Ministers of the CoE adopted a Recommendation to member States on 
measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.135 Over 
                                                 
130 See ‘Girl Child, Eliminating Racism, Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism 
among Issues...’ http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/gashc3970.doc.htm; A/C.3/69/SR.26. See 
Otto, ‘Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism Discourses’ 
(2013) 4 Jindal Global Law Review 79. 
131 See Council of Europe, Committee of Equality and Non-discrimination, Report on Tackling 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, 7 June 2013, available 
at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=19779&Language=en. 
132 See ‘Combating discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity’ 
Council of Europe, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/lgbt/default_en.asp 
133 Article 2, Lanzarote Convention, CETS No. 201. 
134 Istanbul Convention, CETS No. 210. 
135 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1606669. See also Resolutions 1728 (2010) and 1915 
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100 pages of standards have been adopted within the framework of CoE’s institutions.136 In 2011 
the Council of Europe’s then Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, published 
a report entitled Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in 
Europe.137 This was the largest study ever made on homophobia, transphobia and discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 47 member States of the CoE. One of 
the aims was to provide objective data and information that would facilitate a well-informed 
discussion with national authorities. The majority of member States (38) have recognised that 
sexual orientation can be a ground of discrimination in their comprehensive or sectoral non-
discrimination legislation. At that time, nine member States did not appear to protect LGB 
persons against discrimination. However, the issue of sexual orientation discrimination is still 
politically divisive and sensitive amongst CoE member States such as the Russian Federation, 
Moldova, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Croatia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.  
 
(b) The Council of Europe – The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Of all the regional and international human rights systems it is the developments in the ECHR 
with respect to sexual orientation discrimination that have been the most remarkable. As is well 
known the ECtHR interprets the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ and the rights in it are intended 
to be practical and effective. The ECtHR has developed the doctrine of affording States a margin 
of appreciation138 and in ascertaining the breadth of this margin the ECtHR looks to the 
existence or otherwise of member State consensus on the issue concerned.139 The most 
significant ECtHR decisions on sexual orientation issues have only been given since 1981 and 
national implementation of some key elements of the jurisprudence has taken decades. Between 
1955 and 1980 a number of applications challenging the criminalization of homosexuality were 
declared inadmissible by the European Commission on Human Rights on the basis that there was 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Council of Europe has an Expert Committee on 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.  
136 Combating Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity - Council of 
Europe Standards (2011) available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Publications/LGBT_en.pdf 
137 Available at https://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Source/LGBT/LGBTStudy2011_en.pdf.  
138 Protocol 15 ECHR (not yet in force) will insert a reference to the margin of appreciation into 
the Preamble to the ECHR. 
139 See McGoldrick, ‘An Argument for the Universal Application of the Margin of Appreciation 
by the Human Rights Committee’ (2016) 65 ICLQ 21. 
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no violation of any ECHR right.140 In 1977 an application against the UK was held admissible 
but was disposed of by the Committee of Ministers.141 Not until 1981 did a case reach the 
ECtHR. Remarkably, the application was successful. In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom142 the 
ECtHR held, by 15 votes to 4,143 that the criminal prohibition on private homosexual conduct 
between consenting adults in Northern Ireland interfered with their right to respect for private 
life under Article 8 ECHR. That jurisprudence was subsequently applied to Ireland in 1988144 
and to Cyprus in 1993.145 The mere existence of such legislation violated Article 8.146 Although 
most States had decriminalised adult homosexuality by 1998, it took until February 2014, which 
is some 33 years after Dudgeon, for its abolition in all ECHR territories.147  
Dudgeon was seminal because it squarely placed homosexual activity within private life 
under Article 8 ECHR.148 However, as in that case, the ECtHR practice was to decline to 
consider a non-discrimination claim under Article 14 separately even when the issue concerned 
overtly discriminatory policies.149 It would only consider Article 14 separately if it was 
considered to constitute a fundamental aspect of the case. In contrast with Article 26 ICCPR,150 
the non-discrimination guarantee in Article 14 ECHR is an accessory right. Even if there is no 
violation of an ECHR right there may be a violation of Article 14 if the claim falls within the 
                                                 
140 See, for example, W.B. v. Germany, A. 104/55, 17 December 1955.  
141 X v. UK, A. 7215/75, 7 July 1977, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74369. 
142 Dudgeon v. UK, A. 7525/76, (1982) 4 EHRR 40. Sanders, supra n 27, comments that, 
‘Privacy is obviously an inadequate basis for constructing a broader regime of equality for 
homosexuals, because heterosexual relationships are publicly recognised, socially and legally, in 
all societies’, at n 46. 
143 The Cypriot Judge noted in dissent that Christian and Moslem religions were all united in the 
condemnation of homosexual relations and of sodomy. 
144 Norris v. Ireland, A. 10581/83, (1991) 3 EHRR 186, para 46. 
145 See Modinos v. Cyprus, A. 15079/89. (1993) 16 EHRR 485. Cyprus argued there was no 
interference but did not seek to justify any such interference. 
146 Similarly in A.D.T. v. UK, A. 35765/97, (2001) 31 EHRR 33. 
147 The last territory to abolish such criminal offences was Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
H. Ç. v. Turkey, A. 6428/12, was struck out a as the applicant wished to withdraw the application 
in the light of the legislative amendment. 
148 Dudgeon was cited in the majority opinion in the US Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 
538 US 58 (2003) (intimate consensual sexual conduct part of the liberty protected by 
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment). Notwithstanding, the relevant laws 
remain on the books in many States. See Yoshino, ‘The New Equal Protection’ (2011) 124 
Harvard Law Review 747 at 776-81.  
149 See, for example, in Smith and Grady v UK, A. 33985/96 and 33986/96, (2000) 29 EHRR 
493 (the investigation into and subsequent discharge of personnel from the Royal Navy on the 
basis they were homosexual was a breach of their right to a private life). 
150 Protocol 12 ECHR brings Article 14 ECHR closer to Article 26 ICCPR but, as of January 
2016, it had only been ratified by 19 States. 
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‘ambit’ of an ECHR right.151 On the basis of the crucial jurisprudential developments on sexual 
orientation aspects of Article 8 ECHR it has now become easier to construct Article 14 
complaints of discrimination based on sexual orientation. These complaints have been 
considered to come within the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of ‘sex’ or ‘other 
status’.152 In Alekseyev v. Russia153 in 2010 the ECtHR observed that particularly weighty 
reasons needed to be advanced to justify the measure complained of when a distinction based on 
sexual orientation, operated in the ‘intimate and vulnerable sphere of an individual’s private 
life’.154 The ECtHR has increasingly rejected the justifications proffered for differentiations in 
national law.155 The ECtHR now considers discrimination based on sexual orientation to be as 
serious as discrimination based on ‘race, origin or colour’156 and as being in the same suspect 
class as discrimination based on sex.157 In its 2013 judgment in X v. Austria158 the Grand 
Chamber stated that: 
 
Sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14. The Court has repeatedly 
held that, just like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual orientation 
require particularly serious reasons by way of justification or, as is sometimes said, 
particularly convincing and weighty reasons... Where a difference of treatment is 
based on sex or sexual orientation the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow... 
Differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable 
under the Convention159... 
 
                                                 
151 See Harris et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 
2014) at 781-22. 
152 Sutherland v. UK, A. 25186/94, European Commission, (1997) 24 EHRR CD22; Salgueiro 
Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, (2001) 31 EHRR 47.  
153 A. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09 (2010).  
154 Ibid, pr. 108 (emphasis added). On vulnerability see Peroni and Timmer, ‘Vulnerable 
Groups: The Promise of an Emerging Concept in ECHR Law’ (2013) 11 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 1056. 
155 It has rejected justifications for differential ages of consent for heterosexual, homosexual and 
lesbian relations L. and V. v. Austria, A. 39392/98 and 39829/98, (2003) 36 EHRR 55, and for 
refusal to delete the criminal record of homosexuals convicted under discriminatory age of 
consent laws, E.B. and others v. Austria, A. 31913/07 and others.  
156 Vejdeland and Other v. Sweden, A. 1813/07, (2014) 58 EHRR 15, para 55. 
157 Karner v. Austria, A. 40016/98, (2004) 38 EHRR 24. For a critique of the suspect class 
doctrine see Bedi, Beyond Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).  
158 A. 19010/07, (2013) 57 EHRR 14.  
159 Ibid, para 99 (citations omitted). 
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Thus under the ECHR, in US terminology, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is 
presumptively treated as ‘suspect’.160 
There have been major jurisprudential developments in relation to many ECHR 
provisions with respect to sexual orientation. Most of them have only occurred since 1999 and 
rely heavily on the idea of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’.161 As of 2016 there have been 
over 50 sexual orientation cases where a violation of the ECHR has been found and the number 
is steadily rising.162 Some of the most significant have concerned discriminatory rules 
concerning contact rights,163 the adoption of children,164 second-parent adoption of children,165 
rules on child maintenance,166 succession rights,167 freedom of expression and assembly by 
                                                 
160 On the US Supreme Court’s standard of scrutiny for measures that discriminate on grounds of 
sexual orientation see Laird, ‘The Questions Raised by Striking Down DOMA’, available at 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-questions-raised-by-striking-down-doma/. 
161 See Sexual orientation issues, ECtHR, Factsheet, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Sexual_orientation_ENG.pdf (February 2016). 
162 See generally Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2012).  
163 Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, A. 33290/96, (2001) 31 EHRR 47. 
164 E.B. v. France, A. 43546/02, (2008) 47 EHRR 21 (Grand Chamber). Effectively reversing 
Frette v. France, 36515/97, (2002) 38 EHRR 438. 
165 X v. Austria, A. 19010/07, (2013) 57 EHRR 14. Distinguishing Gas and Dubois v. France, A. 
25951/07, 15 March 2012. There was a strong dissent by seven members. In their view the 
majority had gone beyond the usual limits of the ‘living instrument’ approach to interpretation. 
The dissent was based on the particular facts of the case combined with the content of the 
Austrian legislation and a number of considerations relating to comparative and international 
law. See Johnson, ‘Adoption, Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Gas and Dubois v France’ (2012) 75 MLR 1136. 
166 J.M. v. United Kingdom, A. 37060/06, (2011) 53 EHRR 6. 
167 Karner v. Austria, A. 40016/98, (2003) 38 EHRR 528. 
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organizations supporting LGBT rights,168 treatment in detention169 and the obtaining of a 
residence permit for family reunification.170  
In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria171 in 2010 the ECtHR held that same sex couples could 
establish a ‘family’ life for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR. Also that it would no longer 
consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to 
marriage between two persons of the opposite sex. However, as matters stood then, the question 
whether or not to allow same-sex marriage was left to regulation by the national law of the 
Contracting State. Thus the ECHR did not oblige a State to grant same-sex couples access to 
marriage. The national authorities were best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society 
in this field, given that marriage had deep-rooted social and cultural connotations differing 
greatly from one society to another.172 By contrast much less room was afforded for the 
assessment by national authorities in Vallianatos and Others v. Greece173 in 2013 and in Oliari v 
Italy174 in 2015. In Vallianatos a Law of 2008 made provision for an official form of partnership, 
‘civil unions’, but they were only open to different-sex couples, thereby automatically excluding 
same-sex couples from its scope. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 taken together with 
Article 8. It observed that of the 19 States parties to the ECHR that authorised some form of 
                                                 
168 See Alekseyev v. Russia, A. Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09 (2010). Baczkowski v. 
Poland, A. 1543/06, (2004) 38 EHRR 24; Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, A. 1543/06, (2009) 
48 E.H.R.R. 19; Genderdoc-M v. Moldova, A. 9106/06, (12 June 2012); Vejdeland and Others v. 
Sweden, A. 1813/07, (2014) 58 EHRR 15, para 55 (a conviction for distributing leaflets 
offensive to homosexuals was not contrary to Article 10 ECHR); Identoba v Georgia, 
A.73235/12 (12 May 2015) (domestic authorities failed to ensure that the march to support 
LGBT rights could take place peacefully by sufficiently protecting the demonstrators from 
violent counter-demonstrators). Johnson, ‘Homosexuality, Freedom of Assembly and the Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine of the ECtHR’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 578; Thomas, 
‘We’re Here, We’re Queer, Get Used To It: Freedom of Association and Gay Pride in Alekseyev 
v Russia’ (2012) 14 Oregon Review of International Law 505.  
169 X v. Turkey, A.24626/09, 9 October 2012. 
170 Pajić v. Croatia, A. 68453/13 (23 February 2016). 
171 A. 30141/04, (2011) 53 EHRR 20. See also Hämäläinen. v. Finland, A. 37359/09, [GC] 37 
B.H.R.C. 55.  
172 Repeated in Gas and Dubois v. France in 2012, A. 25951/07. See Hodson, ‘A Marriage By 
Any Other Name: Schalk and Kopf v. Austria’ 11 HRLR (2011) 170; Johnson, ‘Interpretation 
and Authority Challenging the Heteronormativity of Marriage: The Role of Judicial 
Interpretation and Authority’ (2011) 20 Social & Legal Studies 349; Hamilton, ‘Why the Margin 
of Appreciation is Not the Answer to the Gay Marriage Debate’ (2013) European Human Rights 
Law Review 47. 
173 A. 29381/09 and 32684/09. See Trispiotis, ‘Discrimination and Civil Partnerships: Taking 
‘Legal’ out of Legal Recognition’ 14 HRLR (2014) 343. 
174 A. 18766/11 and 36030/11 (21 July 2015). 
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registered partnership other than marriage, only Lithuania and Greece reserved it exclusively for 
different-sex couples. In December 2015 the Greek Parliament voted to extend the 2008 Law to 
same-sex couples. In Oliari the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 in the based on the 
inability of homosexual couples to get married or enter into any other type of civil union. The 
legal protection currently available in Italy to same-sex couples not only failed to provide for the 
core needs relevant to a couple in a stable committed relationship, but it was also not sufficiently 
reliable. There was a conflict between the social reality of the applicants, who for the most part 
lived their relationship openly in Italy, and the law, which gave them no official recognition. In 
the Court’s view, an obligation to provide for the recognition and protection of same-sex unions 
would not amount to any particular burden on the Italian State. In the absence of marriage, the 
option of a civil union or registered partnership would be the most appropriate way for same-sex 
couples like the applicants to have their relationship legally recognised. The Court attached 
importance to ‘continuing international movement towards legal recognition’.175 A thin majority 
(24 out of the 47) Council of Europe member States had legislated in favour of such recognition. 
Also of relevance was that the highest courts in Italy had repeatedly pointed out the need for 
legislation to recognise and protect same-sex relationships; that such calls by the Italian courts 
moreover reflected the sentiments of a majority of the Italian population and that the Italian 
Government had not denied the need for legal protection of such couples and had failed to point 
to any community interests against which to justify the applicants ‘momentous interests’.176 Italy 
had thus failed to fulfil its positive obligation to ensure that the applicants had available a 
specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of same-sex unions.177 
However, although the finding of a violation of Article 8 was unanimous, for three of the seven 
judges it was on the basis of different and much narrower reasoning.178 Rather than the positive 
obligations found by the majority, they focused on the defective follow-up, within the Italian 
legal order, of the Constitutional Courts’ declaration of a constitutional entitlement to some form 
of adequate legal recognition of stable same-sex unions.  
The applicants in Oliari also urged the ECtHR to reconsider its approach to the right to 
marry in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, and repeated in Hämäläinen v. Finland,179 that Article 12 
ECHR could not be construed as imposing an obligation on the Contracting States to grant 
                                                 
175 Ibid, para 178. 
176 Ibid, para 185. 
177 On a number of pending applications see 2016 Sexual orientation issues Factsheet, supra n 
161.  
178 See the Concurring Opinion of Judges Mahoney, Tsotsoria and Vehabović. 
179 [GC], A. 37359/09. 
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access to marriage to same-sex couples. However, the ECtHR considered that despite the 
gradual evolution of States on the matter (at that time eleven CoE States had recognised same-
sex marriage) the findings reached in those cases remained pertinent.180 It recalled its view in 
Schalk and Kopf that Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, could not be interpreted as 
imposing such an obligation.181 In March 2016 Italy legislated in response to Oliari. 
Overcoming strong opposition from the Roman Catholic Church, the Bill provided for legal 
recognition to same-sex couples via civil union that provide legal rights similar to those of 
married couples. However, a provision that would have granted non-biological parents in same-
sex unions some parental rights, known as the ‘stepchild’ provision, had to be omitted to ensure 
passage of the legislation. 
 In cases concerning an alleged clash of non-discrimination rights the ECtHR has 
accepted that States can afford greater weight to sexual orientation.182 In 2013 the ECtHR found 
no violations in two cases in which the applicants were practising Christians who had been 
dismissed because they refused to carry out certain duties in the course of employment which 
they felt would condone homosexuality. It could not be said that national courts had failed to 
strike a fair balance when they upheld the employers’ decisions to bring disciplinary 
proceedings. In each case the employer was pursuing a policy of non-discrimination against 
service users, and the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sexual orientation was 
also protected under the ECHR.183 The ECtHR displayed little sympathy towards the applicant’s 
argument that they had acted on the basis of their religious beliefs and therefore had been 
discriminated against on the basis thereof.184 
 
(c) The Council of Europe – The European Social Charter 
 
                                                 
180 Oliari, supra n 174, para 192. 
181 Ibid, para 193. 
182 See Hale, ‘Religion and Sexual Orientation: The Clash of Equality Rights’ (7 March 2014) 
available at supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140307.pdf.  
183 Eweida and Others v. UK, A. 51671/10 and 36516/10, (2013) 57 EHRR 8. No violation of 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 as concerned Ladele; no violation of Article 9 
(freedom of religion), taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14, as concerned McFarlane. 
Two judges, Vučinić and De Gaetano, dissented in Ladele on the basis that it was a matter of 
individual moral conscience and that in any event the discriminatory treatment of her was 
disproportionate. 
184 Cf In 2016 the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in Ashers Baking Co v Lee, considering an 
appeal from a decision finding sexual orientation discrimination in the bakery’s refusal to supply 
a cake decorated with a pro-gay marriage campaign slogan, adjourned the case to permit 
submissions on whether the case also raised freedom of expression issues.  
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The European Committee of Social Rights has interpreted the revised European Social 
Charter (1996), which includes the grounds of ‘sex’ and ‘other status’, to extend to 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.185 Specific reference to the rights of LGBT 
persons in the case law of the Committee has become more frequent. In its decision in 
Interights v. Croatia186 the Committee found that homosexuals were described and 
depicted, in the context of sexual and reproductive health education, in a particularly 
negative and distorted manner, leading to a violation of Article 11(2) (right to protection of 
health) in the light of the non-discrimination clause. As a result of the decision, the 
Croatian authorities withdrew the impugned school manual. 
 
(d) The European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. 
 
For the European Union’s 28 member States discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
is prohibited under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.187 Article 21 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on ‘non-Discrimination’ specifically 
includes sexual orientation as a prohibited ground.188 Article 9 defines marriage in a gender 
neutral manner but the right ‘shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing 
the exercise of these rights’. The accompanying Commentary stated that there was ‘no explicit 
requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages.’189 Moreover, the Charter does 
not extend the scope or field of application of EU law. Article 21 only addresses discriminations 
by the institutions and bodies of the EU themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the 
Treaties, and by Member States when they are implementing Union law (though this is widely 
                                                 
185 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 2006 Vol 1 (Albania) 28, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/conclusions/Year/2006Vol1_en.pdf 
186 Complaint No. 45/2007, decision on the merits of 30 March 2009, paras 60-61, available at 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/complaints/CC45Merits_en.pdf. 
187 See Articles 10 and 19, Official Journal of the European Communities,  
 C 83/47. It entered into force in 2009. For criticism of pre-accession assessments, see 
Kochenov, ‘Democracy and Human Rights - Not for Gay People?’ (2007) 13 Texas Wesleyan 
Law Review 459. 
188 Official Journal of the European Communities, Doc 2000/C 364/01.  
189 Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, prepared in 2006 
by the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, 102, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf. 
32 
 
interpreted).190 More generally, EU equality and anti-discrimination legislation includes express 
reference to sexual orientation.191 Most rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) that touch upon sexual orientation issues have related to financial and economic 
matters.192 This includes non-discrimination and equality in labour law, recruitment and pension 
rights.193 
In June 2012 the Council of the EU adopted the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and 
Democracy.194 It included a commitment that EU member States and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) will work together to develop a strategy on cooperation with third 
countries on the human rights of LGBT people, including through the UN and the CoE.195 In 
2013 the Council of the EU adopted Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all 
human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, Transgender and intersex persons.196 The Guidelines 
support the promotion and protection of LGBT rights in foreign policy, including development 
cooperation. In 2013 the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency published an EU-wide LGBT 
survey.197 
 
(e) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
 
                                                 
190 See Kilpatrick, Commentary on Article 21, in S. Peers et al, The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2014), 579-603; Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action Under 
the General Principles and the Charter: Defining the “scope of Union law”’ (2015) 52 Common 
Market Law Review 1201.  
191 See Directive 2000/78/EC, the Framework Equal Treatment Directive, [2000] OJ L303/16, 
Article 1; O’Cinneide, ‘The Constitutionalization of Equality Within the EU Legal Order: 
Sexual Orientation as a Testing Ground’ (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 370. 
192 See, for example, Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, judgment (Grand Chamber), 
Case C-147/08 (Grand Chamber), (2013) 2 C.M.L.R. 11; Hay v Crédit agricole mutuel de 
Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres, Case No C-267/12, (2014) 2 C.M.L.R. 32. 
193 See also its rulings on refugees, infra Part 5(e). 
194 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf. 
195 http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/lgbt/index_en.htm. 
196 Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137584.pdf.  
197 Available at http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/eu-lgbt-survey-european-union-lesbian-
gay-bisexual-and-transgender-survey-results. 
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In May 2014 at the OSCE Permanent Council, the Canadian representative decried the fact that, 
while there was a strong consensus among participating States on responding to acts of 
intimidation and violence on the basis of race, religion or sex, the same did not hold true when it 
came to sexual orientation.198 
 
(f) The Organisation of American States  
There have been some outstanding developments in the Organisation of American States (35 
member States). Since 2008 the General Assembly of the OAS has passed resolutions 
condemning all forms of discrimination and violence against persons because of their sexual 
orientation.199 However, a number of member States have been unable to join the consensus on 
the resolutions because there was no national consensus on the issues or they wished to maintain 
national laws that might be inconsistent with the resolution.200 In November 2011 the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights announced the creation of an LGBT unit in order to 
strengthen its capacity to protect their rights.201 In June 2013 the Organization of American 
States adopted a resolution asking States to establish mechanisms to combat discrimination 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity and to protect human rights defenders working on 
the issue.202 In November 2013 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights became the 
world’s first inter-governmental human rights body to establish a Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Persons.203 In 2013 the OAS adopted the Inter-
                                                 
198 Available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/124706?download=true. 
199 See ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity and Expression’ AG/RES, 2863 
(XLIV-O/14) (5 June 2014) in OAS, General Assembly, Forty-Fourth Regular Session, June 3-
5, 2014, OEA/Ser.P/XLIV-O.2 at 241.  
200 Ibid, fns 1-13, covering 13 member States (out of 35). There was also concern about the 
expression ‘gender identity’ was not thoroughly defined internationally or that had international 
acceptance (St. Vincent and the Grenadines). 
201 ‘IACHR Creates Unit on the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Persons’ 
available at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/115.asp. As of 2016 a 
number of LGBT cases against were pending before the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission against Jamaica relating to its anti-gay laws (X and Z, Tomlinson and Henry). 
Jamaica has not accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR. See Tomlinson, ‘HIV and Caribbean 
Law: Case for Tolerance’ 29th August 2013, Oxford Human Rights Hub, 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/hiv-and-caribbean-law-case-for-tolerance. 
202 AG/RES. 2807. 
203 The current holder of the post is Eguiguren Praeli. See 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/mandate/responsibility.asp. 
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American Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance.204 Sexual 
orientation is expressly included among the prohibited grounds of discrimination.205 The Inter-
American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons (2015) contained two 
express references to sexual orientation. 
 
(g) The Organisation of American States and the American Convention on Human 
Rights  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) follows much of the substantive 
jurisprudence and the interpretative approaches of the ECtHR. However, significantly in this 
context, it does not then explain or justify its decisions by reference to any margin of 
appreciation afforded to States.206 Moreover, the notion of ‘regional consensus’, which is critical 
in the ECHR system, rarely figures in its decisions.207 In February 2012, the IACtHR decided its 
first ever sexual orientation discrimination case - Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile.208 This 
concerned a Chilean Supreme Court decision resulting in a Chilean mother losing custody of her 
child because of her sexual orientation. The IACtHR unanimously found violations of the right 
to equal protection (Article 24), and the right to privacy (Article 11), both in conjunction with 
general obligation to respect rights in Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(AmCHR). That general obligation is owed ‘to all persons…, without discrimination for reasons 
of …, or of any other social condition’. The express grounds set out in Article 1 did not include 
sexual orientation so the IACtHR had to determine if it was covered as a ‘social condition’. As 
with the ECtHR, the IACtHR’s established approach to interpretation is that human rights 
treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times 
and current living conditions. It viewed this evolving interpretation as consistent with the general 
rules of interpretation set forth in Article 29 of the AmCHR, as well as those established in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). As the list in Article 1 was merely 
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illustrative, the IACtHR held that the term ‘any other social condition’ should be interpreted in 
the manner most favourable option for the human being and in light of the evolution of 
fundamental rights in contemporary international law.209 The IACtHR recited four annual 
resolutions of the GA of the OAS referring to the protection of persons against discriminatory 
treatment based on their sexual orientation,210 jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the HRC, the Cee 
ESCR, the Cee Rights of the Child,211 the Cee against Torture,212 the Cee Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women,213 resolutions from the UN’s GA and Human Rights Council214 
and numerous reports by special rapporteurs of the United Nations to support its conclusion that 
...the sexual orientation of persons is a category protected by the Convention. Therefore, 
any regulation, act, or practice considered discriminatory based on a person’s sexual 
orientation is prohibited. Consequently, no domestic regulation, decision, or practice, 
whether by State authorities or individuals, may diminish or restrict, in any way 
whatsoever, the rights of a person based on his or her sexual orientation.215 
 
In response to the State’s argument the IACtHR pointed out that the alleged lack of consensus in 
some countries regarding full respect for the rights of sexual minorities could not be considered 
a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the 
historical and structural discrimination that these minorities had suffered. In support of this point 
the IACtHR stated that, according to different international and comparative law sources, 
discrimination against the lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual, and intersexual was unacceptable 
because (i) sexual orientation constituted an essential aspect of a person’s identity; (ii) the 
LGTBI community had been historically discriminated against and the use of stereotypes in 
treatment towards that community was common; (iii) they constituted a minority that faced 
greater difficulty in removing discrimination in areas such as the legislative sphere, as well as 
avoiding negative repercussions in the interpretation of regulations by officials of the executive 
or legislative branches and in access to justice; (iv) sexual orientation did not constitute a 
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rational criterion for the rational and equal distribution or sharing of properties, rights, or social 
burdens.216 The fact that this was a controversial issue in some sectors and countries, and that it 
was not necessarily a matter of consensus, could not lead the IACtHR to abstain from issuing a 
decision, since in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the 
international obligations arising from a sovereign decision by the States to adhere to the 
AmCHR.217 On the facts of the case the IACtHR found that sexual orientation had been a 
decisive factor in the judgment of the Supreme Court.218  
 Significantly, the IACtHR went on to hold that, in the abstract, a child’s best interests 
could not be used to justify discrimination against the parents based on their sexual orientation. 
A determination based on unfounded and stereotyped assumptions about a parent’s capacity and 
suitability to ensure and promote the child’s well-being and development was not appropriate for 
the purpose of guaranteeing the legitimate goal of protecting the child’s best interest.219 The 
IACtHR considered four arguments used by the Supreme Court to protect the best interest of the 
three girls and that directly related to the mother’s sexual orientation – social discrimination, 
confusion of sexual roles, the mother’s privileging of her own personal relationship interests and 
the right to a normal and traditional family.220 In rejecting each argument the IACtHR referred to 
national and international jurisprudence and expert evidence and reports. The IACtHR also 
confirmed that the AmCHR did not define a limited concept of family, nor did it only protect a 
‘traditional’ model of the family. It reiterated that the concept of family life was not limited only 
to marriage and encompassed other de facto family ties in which the parties lived together 
outside of marriage.221  
 In 2015 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights referred the case of Homero 
Flor Freire v. Ecuador222 to the IACtHR. The case concerned dismissal from the Army as 
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punishment for sexual acts between persons of the same sex. It also held admissible an 
application from a Chilean teacher alleging dismissal from a Catholic school for being a lesbian.  
  
(h) The African Union  
 
The contrast between the positions in Europe and the Americas with that in Africa is 
striking.223 To the extent that the former can be described as dynamic and progressive, the 
situation in the AU is somewhere between negative and regressive. It has been suggested 
that Africa is by far the continent with the worst laws on the books when it comes to 
homosexuality and other sexual minorities, a phenomenon which is in part rooted in bad 
colonial-era laws and political situations, religious autonomy, strong beliefs in cultural and 
family values, and patriarchy.224  
 
(i) The African Union and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AfCHPR) prohibits 
discrimination in terms similar to Article 2 of the ICCPR.225 There is no reference to sexual 
orientation but again the list of grounds is illustrative (‘such as’).226 However, it has been 
suggested that gaining recognition for ‘sexual orientation’ as within ‘other status’ in the non-
discrimination provision in Article 2 AFCHPR appears unlikely.227 The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights has paid relatively little attention to sexual orientation issues despite 
significant co-ordinated pressure from NGOs. They have been raised within the reporting 
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procedure. With respect to Cameroon in 2005 the Commission stated that it was ‘worried about 
the upsurge in intolerance towards sexual minorities’.228 In Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum v Zimbabwe229 in 2006 the Commission stated, obiter, with respect to Article 2, that ‘The 
aim of this principle is to ensure equality of treatment for individuals irrespective of nationality, 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation’.230 Neither the African Commission nor the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (which only delivered its first judgment in 2009) has issued a decision on a sexual 
orientation discrimination complaint. It has been suggested that individuals have been 
discouraged from bringing individual complains for fear of establishing negative precedents and 
engendering a backlash from governments.231 A 1994 complaint concerning the criminalization 
of homosexuality in Zimbabwe was withdrawn in 1995 at the request of the Gays and Lesbians 
of Zimbabwe who were concerned that the then relatively large amount of de facto freedom 
would be jeopardized.232 Obviously the factual situation in Zimbabwe has significantly 
deteriorated since that time.233 However, in 2010 the African Commission denied the Coalition 
of African Lesbians (CAL) observer status even though the organisation appeared to meet all the 
necessary criteria.234 The reasons given were that ‘the activities of the said Organisation do not 
promote and protect any of the rights enshrined in the African Charter’ and that CAL’s 
objectives were not consonant with the AU Constitutive Act and the African Charter.235 This 
reasoning is difficult to sustain and is inconsistent with the Commission’s practice of accepting 
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that the rights in the Charter apply to sexual minorities.236 In a significant development in 2014 
the African Commission adopted Resolution 275 the ‘Protection Against Violence and Other 
Human Rights Violations Against Persons on the Basis of their Real or Imputed Sexual 
Orientation or Gender Identity’.237 It strongly urged States to end all acts of violence and abuse, 
whether committed by State or non-state actors, including by enacting and effectively applying 
appropriate laws prohibiting and punishing all forms of violence including those targeting 
persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identities, ensuring 
proper investigation and diligent prosecution of perpetrators, and establishing judicial 
procedures responsive to the needs of victims. 
Under Article 60 AfCHPR the African Commission can ‘draw inspiration from international 
law on human and peoples’ rights’. The African Court applies the African Charter so should be 
able to do the same. The African Commission has been strongly influenced by the ECHR 
jurisprudence. It is interesting to consider whether the Commission and now the Court will 
follow the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on sexual orientation issues as they have in other areas.238 
There are provisions of the AfCHPR that be used to support sexual orientation complaints, but 
there are also significant textual differences, in particular, the absence of a right to privacy.239 In 
one sense the domestic situation in many African States looks similar to that which prevailed in 
Europe between 1950 and 1981 and during which the European Commission rejected 
applications challenging restrictions on homosexuality. As noted, the fundamental shift in ECHR 
jurisprudence came with the Dudgeon decision in 1981.240 What is different is that the ECtHR 
could observe that, as compared with the era when the relevant legislation was enacted, there 
was now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of homosexual 
behaviour. This understanding and tolerance have not spread in Africa in anything like the same 
manner. Secondly, the ECtHR could not overlook the marked changes that had occurred in this 
regard in the domestic law of the member States of the Council of Europe. Again this has not 
occurred in Africa. If anything there is an increase in repressive legislation (as in Nigeria).241 
Thirdly, in Northern Ireland the authorities had refrained in the years preceding Dudgeon from 
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enforcing the relevant criminal law and no evidence had been adduced to show that this had been 
injurious to moral standards. By contrast prosecutions and convictions have been and are still 
happening in many African States.242 Fourthly, there had not been any public demand in 
Northern Ireland for stricter enforcement of the law. Again the contrary has been the case in at 
least some African States.243  
 
(j) ASEAN and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration  
 
In comparative terms the situation in the ASEAN is also broadly negative and repressive, 
although developments are complex and mixed. In addition, change tends to be informal rather 
than formal, incremental rather than dramatic. Colonial criminal laws are gone in Hong Kong, 
but survive in other former British colonies – Bangladesh, Brunei, India, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. In 2014 Brunei announced that it would introduce a new 
penal code with death by stoning as a possible punishment for Muslims guilty of rape, adultery, 
sodomy or extramarital sexual relations. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that overall Asia is 
becoming more LGBT friendly.244 There is no regional ASEAN human rights treaty. It is notable 
that the most recent international statement of human rights – the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration (2012) failed to mention LGBT rights at all.245 During drafting of the Declaration, 
Malaysia and Brunei, States with majority Islamic populations and which apply Sharia law, 
strongly objected to the inclusion of rights of sexual orientation and gender identity, as did 
Singapore.246  
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(k) The Arab League and the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
 
With respect to Arab States, religious teaching based on Sharia law,247 conservatism, traditions 
and conceptions of social order make for an environment which is more hostile to human rights 
in general and to ideas of sexual orientation discrimination in particular.248 Given the views of 
Arab States in the UN it is unsurprising that the revised Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 
prohibits discrimination but does not mention sexual orientation. Nor indeed does it include a 
reference to any ‘other status’. The Arab Charter has no individual complaints mechanism249 and 
there is no political will to adopt any instrument with a specific reference to sexual orientation. 
Evidence is provided for this by the fact that the opposing Response to the 2008 Joint Statement 
on the human rights of LGBT persons sent to the GA was backed by the Arab League.250 As 
noted, the Arab Group at the UN has argued against consideration of the subject of sexual 
orientation.251 It is unlikely, therefore, that there will be many positive developments in this 
regional area at any time soon. 
 
5. The Prohibition on Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a National Human 
Rights Issue 
International human rights bodies vary in whether they specifically look to identify the 
development of consensus at national level. The ECtHR does but the IACtHR and the HRCee do 
not. Nonetheless, the probability and legitimacy of international progress on sexual orientation 
discrimination is undoubtedly linked to such developments. States that oppose recognition of 
sexual orientation discrimination as a violation of a human right have tended to simply reverse 
the arguments relating to interpretation and application. They have not been able to deny that 
human rights apply to ‘everyone’ but stress that very few national, regional or international 
provisions prohibiting discrimination expressly refer to sexual orientation. They have 
criminalized same-sex relationships, which are not considered by them to be protected by the 
rights to private or family life. They reject the view that sexual orientation falls within ‘sex’ or 
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‘other status’. They regard such an interpretation as going beyond the permissible limits of a 
living instrument approach to the interpretation of human rights treaties and inconsistent with 
their object and purpose. Even if such an interpretation of ‘other status’ was justifiable, these 
States reject the view that such differential treatment can only be justified by ‘particularly 
serious or weighty reasons’. A lower standard of reasonable and objective reasons is considered 
applicable. Or, in the alternative, these States argue that they do have ‘particularly serious or 
weighty reasons’: ones that reflect their tradition, culture and /or religion. Finally, they would 
argue that the fact that some international human rights institutions have copied and imitated 
each other’s jurisprudence to reach the contrary result does not make that result justifiable. 
A large number of States from different regions have rejected a prohibition on sexual 
orientation discrimination. Some African political and religious leaders have argued that gay 
rights are against African traditions, cultural and religious value systems252 and African nations 
have a sovereign right to reject what is seen as an imperialist253 or post-colonial imposition by 
mainly Western nations,254 which have sought to affect national sentiment via aid and trade 
conditionality.255 The latter is particularly controversial.256 The argument of some African States 
and leaders is that acceptance of homosexuality is a cultural import of the ‘West’. Essentially the 
same argument has frequently been used to oppose the equality of women and many of the 
arguments against it are the same.257 It disregards the fact that culture and tradition are neither 
static nor monolithic. Non-heteronormative sexual orientations and gender identities have 
existed in all world regions, including Africa. Homosexuality has been present in African culture 
throughout history.258 In many African societies, it is not uncommon to acknowledge same-sex 
relationships. For example, in 2011 a High Court in Kenya upheld the validity of a traditional 
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Nandi woman-to-woman marriage.259 As for the colonialist argument, it has been argued that, 
historically Africa has always been the friendliest and most tolerant continent, with 
homosexuality and same-gender behaviours dating back to the time before colonialism and the 
intervention of Western religion.260 The arrival of colonial powers, accompanied by the 
influence of religious fundamentalism, contributed to criminalisation of homosexuality.261 In 
fact, it was under British colonial rule that homosexual acts were first criminalised in many of its 
colonial territories around the world.262 Many of those statutory provisions survive. It is thus 
seriously open to question whether those laws reflect the colonial values or continuing African 
ones. It has also been observed that no serious or coherent attempt has been made to investigate 
what distinctive African values might be.263 Some doubt on the ‘African-ness’ of the measure 
stems from evidence that American evangelical organizations have been complicit in sponsoring 
what became the 2014 Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act.264  
Some Asia Pacific governments have also marginalized LGBT communities by promoting a 
narrow conception of ‘Asian Values’ that emphasizes homogenous rather than diverse societies 
where the only acceptable norm is heterosexuality.265 More generally, Muslim States have 
consistently opposed the notion of sexual orientation as having no legal foundation in 
international law and being contrary to Islamic teaching.266 The Organization of Islamic 
                                                 
259 Monica Jesang Katam v. Jackson Chepkwony & Another (2011) eKLR, available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/newsletter/20110708.html. 
260 See Itaborahy and Zhu (eds), State Sponsored Homophobia – A World Survey of laws: 
Criminalization, Protection and Recognition of Same Sex Love, 9th edn, May 2014, 33-35, 
available at http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_SSHR_2014_Eng.pdf. 
261 Ibid. 
262 See Human Rights Watch, This Alien Legacy - The Origins of ‘Sodomy’ Laws in British 
Colonialism, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/17/alien-legacy-0. 
Homosexuality was decriminalized in post-Revolution France and its colonies, see Aldrich, 
‘Homosexuality in the French Colonies’ (2002) 41 (3-4) Journal of Homosexuality 201. 
263 See Richards, supra n 12, 221; Sadgrove et al, ‘Morality Plays and Money Matters: Towards 
a Situated Understanding of the Politics of Homosexuality in Uganda’ (2012) 50 Journal of 
Modern African Studies 103; Epprecht, Hungochani: The History of Dissident Sexuality in 
Southern Africa, 2nd edn (Montreal: McGill-Queens Press, 2013). Article 29 AfCHPR refers to 
‘positive African cultural values’. 
264 See text to nn 275-77 infra. An alien torts claim has begun against Scott Lively, an 
evangelical minister in the US, for his role in lobbying for the Ugandan legislation, see Sexual 
Minorities Uganda v. Scott Lively, C.A. No. 12-cv-30051-Map (Aug. 14, 2013), 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/SMUG_OrderDenyingDefMTD_08_13.pdf; Bennett-Smith, Scott 
Lively, “Kill The Gays” Bill Supporter, Says “Right To Sodomy” Is Destroying Human Rights’ 
The Huffington Post, 23 Jan. 2013.  
265 Oslo Conference Report, supra n 6, 20. Cf. the Asian values debate, supra n 252. 
266 See Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003) at 117.  
44 
 
Conference (OIC) has been the central forum through which objections have been 
coordinated.267  
Significant legislative, policy and judicial developments, both positive and negative, have 
taken place in a number of States and regions. To gain a sense of the complexity and speed of 
state practice in terms of developments at the national level it is helpful to assess the broad state 
of play in 2016 in some critical thematic areas. 
 
(a) Criminalisation of homosexual activities and the prohibition of hate crimes 
 
As of May 2016 homosexual acts were legal in over 119 States.268 In regional terms these were 
drawn from Africa (21), Asia (19), the Americas (24), Oceania (7) and Europe (48). However, 
some 74 States still retain laws that discriminate against people on the basis of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity.269 That is a very high number and a substantial proportion of 
States (39% of UN Member States). In regional terms the 74 are drawn from Africa (34), Asia 
(23), the Americas (11)270 and Oceania (7).271 41 Commonwealth member States still criminalize 
homosexuality.272 In 13 States, or parts thereof, the death penalty may be applied to those found 
guilty of offences relating to consensual same-sex relations. There have been reported 
executions of four men on homosexuality charges in Iran.273 The States that criminalize 
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homosexual conduct represent more than two-thirds of the OIC membership. The practical 
situation in Muslim States is more complex if Sharia law is applied. Indonesia had largely 
ignored LGBT persons but in March 2015 it was reported that the Indonesian Islamic Authority, 
the Ulema Council, had issued a fatwa calling for a range of punishments, from caning to the 
death penalty, for homosexual acts.274 2016 saw a number of anti-LGBT statements from 
political and religious leaders.  
The broad picture in Africa is varied. The position in Uganda has attracted a significant 
level of international attention. The Anti-Homosexuality Bill, first introduced in October 2009, 
would have imposed the death penalty for certain acts of ‘aggravated homosexuality’ and 
prohibited the ‘promotion of homosexuality’.275 Before the Bill had been adopted into law, its 
existence was allegedly used to justify a series of repressive measures.276 When finally passed, 
the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014 provided for life imprisonment rather than the death 
penalty. The bill was signed into law by the President of Uganda on 24 February 2014. 
However, in August 2014, the Ugandan Constitutional Court declared the Act unconstitutional 
because it was passed without sufficient quorum for a vote in Parliament. Ugandan President 
Yoweri Museveni commented that his country risked a trade boycott by the West if it 
reintroduced the anti-gay law277 and the government has not appealed the ruling to the Supreme 
Court. In another recent development of note, Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act 
(2014) outlawed homosexuality.278 In Tanzania, and Sierra Leone, as well as Uganda, offenders 
can receive life imprisonment for homosexual acts.279 At the same time, as well as homosexual 
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acts now being legal in some 21 African States,280 same-sex sexual activities between adults 
have never been criminalised in some 11 others. 
India provides another example of the mixed nature of developments. In 2009 the High 
Court in Delhi held that section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (on ‘carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature’), insofar as it criminalised consensual sexual acts of adults in private, violated 
Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution. However, in 2013 this was reversed by the Supreme 
Court in a judgment that was dismissive of alleged discrimination towards sexual minorities, 
hostile in tone to the ‘so-called rights of LGBT persons’, considered that the judgments of other 
jurisdictions (including the US, ECtHR and South Africa) could not be applied blindfolded to 
decide the constitutionality of a law enacted by the Indian legislature without a critical 
examination of the conditions, social norms and attitudes in India, and expressed the view that 
only a miniscule fraction of the country’s population constituted lesbians and gays.281 The 
decision in Koushal has attracted criticism.282 In February 2016 the Supreme Court decided to 
refer to issue to a five-judge Constitution Bench for re-consideration. Interestingly, gender rights 
are better protected in India than homosexual relations. Only a few months later a different 
division of the Supreme Court cited extensively from foreign jurisdictions to support its 
innovative decision to recognise not just transgender rights, but a third gender.283  
As for homophobic hate crimes, as of May 2016 there were some 36 States in which 
incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation was prohibited.284 Most of these were in Europe. 
In 40 States, if a hate crime was based on sexual orientation, this was considered an aggravating 
circumstance.285 Again most of these laws were found in Europe.  
 
(b) The express prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
 
An increasing number of States have sought to strengthen human rights protection in the context 
of sexual orientation discrimination. These are evidenced in the OHCHR, Council of Europe and 
                                                 
280 State-Sponsored Homophobia 2016, supra n 268, 34. 
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FRA Reports.286 A range of new laws have been adopted including laws banning discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. The age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual acts is now 
equal as a matter of law in some 103 States, spread among all continents but remains unequal in 
at least 16 (8 of which are in Africa).287 Discrimination in employment based on sexual 
orientation is legally prohibited in some 70 States (including 8 in Africa and 14 in the 
Americas), with a further 13 having a Constitutional prohibition of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.288 In Chile the first ever anti-discrimination law, which included 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, known as the ‘Ley Zamudio’ after a young 
man who was murdered due to his sexual preferences, came into effect in 2012.289 A number of 
Muslim States have seen legislative and judicial developments that are more positive in terms of 
sexual orientation discrimination.290 Given the critical legal importance of Constitutions it is 
always significant if States engage in constitutional change that reflects their position on human 
rights issues. It was notable that in 2014 the Maltese parliament passed an amendment to the 
country’s constitution including sexual orientation among the grounds of prohibited 
discrimination.291 By contrast, in the context of proposed constitutional reforms in Romania in 
2013 a Constitutional Forum’s proposal to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination provoked such a strong public reaction and protests from religious groups that it 
was dropped from its final proposal.  
The UK is a good example of a State that has been at forefront of the campaign against 
sexual orientation discrimination both internally and externally.292 By contrast the situation with 
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respect to issues of sexual orientation discrimination in the Russian Federation has attracted a lot 
of international criticism and debate.293 Russia’s official view is that there are no discriminatory 
policies against lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender persons in the Russian Federation.294 There 
may be a disconnect between official State policy and political policies and attitudes. It has been 
reported that the Russian President, Vladmimir Putin, regards the West’s promotion of gay rights 
as exemplifying its decadence and the decaying of its values.295 Although many countries in 
Africa are showing little progress in terms of prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and, more generally, protecting the human rights of LGBT people, there have been 
some promising developments even in States with hostile laws, policies and practices.296 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa have progressive employment acts which 
set standards for non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In Kasha and Others v 
Rolling Stone and Another297 the High Court in Uganda found a violation of the rights to dignity, 
privacy and protection from inhuman treatment where a magazine had published the photos, 
names and addresses of 100 homosexuals under the heading ‘Hang them: they are after our 
kids!’. The most significant and widespread progress by African governments has been the 
inclusion of men who have sex with men in National HIV plans and consultation processes to 
strengthen the response and effectiveness of national HIV responses.  
(c) Same-Sex Marriages and Joint Adoption by Same Sex Couples 
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The trend towards legalizing same sex marriage is another indicator of incremental support for 
non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.298 The number of countries that have 
legalised same-sex marriage is relatively small. As of May 2016 marriage was open for same-
sex couples in some 22 States or parts thereof (11% of UN Member States) either on the basis of 
court rulings or legislation.299 In United States v. Windsor in 2013 the underlying issues 
concerned federal tax benefits and tax liabilities. The United States Supreme Court held by 5 
votes to 4 that s. 3 of the federal Defence of Marriage Act 1996 violated the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws so far as certain tax laws discriminated against persons 
of the same sex who were legally married under the laws of their State.300 The Act defined 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman. In an historic ruling in 2015, Obergefell v. 
Hodges301 another 5:4 majority held that the Fourteenth Amendment required States to license a 
marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a same sex marriage licensed and 
performed out of State. However, the Court was bitterly divided and neither the majority nor the 
minority made any reference to international human rights standards or jurisprudence. In Ireland 
same-sex marriage was approved by a referendum in May 2015. However, some States have 
reinforced the existing position on marriage. In Hungary in January 2013, a new Constitution 
entered into force which restricted the definition of marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman. A new Family Protection Act also came into force that defined the family unit as 
heterosexual. In 2013 the Australian High Court unanimously found the whole of the Australian 
Capital Territory’s Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013, which purported to legalise same-
sex marriage in the ACT, to be inconsistent with the Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961 and of 
no effect.302 However, it also made clear that the Commonwealth had the power to enact same-
sex marriage legislation. As to status, same-sex couples are offered some rights of marriage via 
Civil Partnerships, Registered Partnerships, Civil Unions in 18 States.303 
Another indicator of support for non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation relates 
to the possibility of adoption. As of May 2016 full joint adoption by same-sex couples was only 
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legal in 26 States or parts thereof and most of which were in Europe and the Americas.304 The 
only African State was South Africa. The only State in the Asian grouping was Israel.  
(d) Gay Pride Marches and Homosexual Propaganda Laws 
State and public support for and opposition to Gay Pride Marches are yet another contemporary 
indicator of attitudes to sexual orientation discrimination. The marches both celebrate LGBT 
culture and serve as political demonstrations for more extensive legal rights. Marches have been 
held in all continents and some have attracted millions of participants. Turkey is the first and 
only Muslim-majority country in which a gay pride march has been held. Some marches have 
attracted government support. Others have attracted opposition from protesters. In Serbia in 
2010 there were violent clashes between police and groups of protesters. Not until 2014 was a 
successful parade held. In August 2015 Ukraine banned its Pride march. Since 2002 marches in 
Israel have been marked by controversy and a series of legal challenges particularly from 
religious groups.305 In July 2015 six people were stabbed by an extremist opponent of the Pride 
march in Tel Aviv in Israel One of them died. Denial or permission to hold marches or 
assemblies promoting gay rights or restrictions on them have been held to violate Article 11 
(freedom of assembly) and 14 ECHR306 and Article 21 ICCPR (freedom of assembly).307  
The Russian Federation considers that its homosexual propaganda laws do not constitute 
sexual orientation discrimination but are aimed at the protection of children. Particular 
international controversy has focussed on bans in the Russian Federation on homosexual 
propaganda, specifically in relation to minors.308 One Republic, eight regions and the City of St 
Petersburg have passed legislation prohibiting promotion of ‘homosexual propaganda’ among 
minors. The legislation has been used to arrest and convict activists holding signs expressing 
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support for equality and affirming LGBT human rights.309 In its Decision No. 151-O-O of 19 
January 2010 the Russian Constitutional Court held that the prohibition on the promotion of 
homosexuality did not violate constitutional rights. On 29 June 2013 Russia adopted Federal 
Law No. 135-FZ aimed at protecting children from information promoting the denial of 
traditional family values.310 The law banned the ‘promotion of nontraditional sexual relations to 
minors,’ a reference that was universally understood to be lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
relationships. The Law levied fines for promoting homosexuality.311 In September 2014 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the law was not in breach of the Constitution.312 Wide public 
support for such propaganda laws has also been reported, as has support from the Russian 
Orthodox Church.313  
In February 2013 a group of four UN Special Rapporteurs called on the Russian parliament 
to discard the draft Bill, but to no avail.314 A Human Rights Watch Report in 2014 documented 
the spread of homophobic and transphobic violence and everyday harassment against LGBT 
people and activists that had taken place in the lead-up to and aftermath of the adoption of the 
2013 anti-LGBT law.315 As noted above, in 2012 the HRC held in Fedotova v. Russian 
Federation,316 that the State had not shown that a restriction on the right to freedom of 
expression in relation to ‘propaganda of homosexuality’ – as opposed to propaganda of 
heterosexuality or sexuality generally – among minors was based on reasonable and objective 
criteria. Applications concerning the prohibition of ‘homosexual propaganda’ in Russia are now 
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pending before the ECtHR.317 In 2014 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
recommended that Russia repeal its laws prohibiting propaganda of homosexuality and ensure 
that children who belonged to LGBT groups or children from LGBT families were not subjected 
to any forms of discrimination by raising the public’s awareness of equality and non-
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.318 In 2013 and 2014, 9 
States, including Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania, have either passed laws, or parliaments 
were considering Bills, regarding so-called ‘homosexual propaganda’ laws.319 In 2014 Lithuania 
introduced a ban on spreading information that would promote sexual relations or encourages 
the concept of entry into a marriage and creation of a family other than stipulated in the 
Constitution or the Civil Code.320 
(e) Asylum and Refugees – persecution on grounds of sexual orientation 
 
Some very protective jurisprudence on persecution on grounds of sexual orientation has been 
developed in a refugee context. In 2008 (updated in 2012) the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees has published ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status 
based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’.321 In 2011 the 
UNHCR estimated that at least 42 States had granted asylum to individuals with a well-founded 
fear of persecution owing to sexual orientation or gender identity.322 In 2010 the UK Supreme 
Court held that it would violate Article 3 ECHR if individuals were be deported to a State in 
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which they would have to hide their sexual identity.323 In 2015 it held that there could be, in 
general, a serious risk of persecution on grounds of sexual orientation without that persecution 
affecting any particular percentage of the population.324 The Australian High Court has also held 
that homosexuals cannot be obliged to live discretely to avoid being persecuted.325 The CJEU 
has held that, when assessing an application for refugee status, the existence of criminal laws 
which specifically target homosexuals, supports the finding that those persons must be regarded 
as forming a ‘particular social group’ and that the competent authorities cannot reasonably 
expect, in order to avoid the risk of persecution, an applicant for asylum to conceal his 
homosexuality in his country of origin or to exercise reserve in expression of his sexual 
orientation.326 It has also established limits to detailed questioning of, and evidence from, 
refugees seeking asylum on the basis of their sexual orientation.327 In 2012 the Italian Supreme 
Court held that the criminalisation against homosexual acts provided by Article 319 of the 
criminal code of Senegal was in itself a general condition of deprivation of the fundamental right 
to live an emotional and sexual life without restrictions. Such criminalisation of homosexual acts 
by this provision was considered to be in itself a form of persecution.328 
 
6. The Consequences of the Contested Status of Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination as an international human rights law issue  
 
As has been evidenced, States take diametrically opposite positions on whether a prohibition on 
sexual orientation discrimination is an ‘Existing’ Right or a ‘New’ Right. A substantial body of 
States do not accept it as an existing right based on a living instrument interpretation of human 
rights treaties. Nor would they accept it as a new right. Their opposition is reflected in the 
existence of a significant degree of legislative and judicial practice - including in many States 
which are legally bound by the relevant human rights treaties - and strong public opposition, 
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particularly linked to tradition, culture, religiosity and relative poverty. The divisions between 
States appear to be fundamental. The widespread and significant opposition from States to this 
normative rise of sexual orientation discrimination has created a situation in which there is a 
very serious tension between what is asserted to be clear international human rights law and 
what are clearly the practices of a large number of States from all regions of the world and 
marked regional differences. It is notable that both sides of the argument have prayed in aid the 
same paragraph of the 1993 Vienna Declaration to support their understanding of human rights 
law.329 One side emphasises the ‘various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds’ that must 
be borne in mind, while the other points to the ‘duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. When posed as an abstract question of whether there is an ‘Existing’ Right or a 
‘New’ Right, there is no possibility of bridging the divide as such.330  
Interestingly, however, it is actually the very fragmented nature of international law that 
allows such differences to remain unresolved. Where States have accepted human rights treaties 
they are obviously legally binding on them as such. However, few human rights treaties have a 
system under which a binding legal interpretation of the treaty is ever reached. To the extent that 
they do not, it is open to States to adopt and maintain different interpretations of the treaty.331 In 
very formalistic terms we can look at whether human rights institutions can impose specific 
obligations on States in relation to sexual orientation discrimination. International law offers 
only limited possibilities for this. Where the ECtHR332 or the IACtHR333 has issued specific 
rulings then these are formally legally binding only with respect to the States concerned. Even 
then those States may comply in the most minimalistic fashion and over lengthy periods of time 
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or not at all.334 Of course, the jurisprudence of those respective courts is commonly accorded a 
high or persuasive status by other States parties and if it is not followed then individual 
applications may follow where this possibility is open to individuals or NGOs.335 For the ECtHR 
there is mandatory access. Individuals can submit petitions to the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights but its decisions are not legally binding. For the IACtHR access only been 
accepted by 22 States and all cases must be referred by the Inter-American Commission. 
Judgments of the CJEU are legally binding but cover only a limited range of issues. There are no 
individual petitions systems with ASEAN or the Arab League. As noted, with respect to the 
ICCPR, the General Comments and Concluding Observations of the HRC, and their Views under 
OP1, are not legally binding but they are authoritative.336 States rarely make a formal protest but 
their subsequent reports and responses to the HRC, and their subsequent practice, make it clear 
that they do not acquiesce to the HRC’s interpretations. The same is true for all of the UN treaty 
bodies.337 The Special Procedures and UPR processes are more in the nature of dialogic and 
advisory systems and do not result in legally binding outcomes. 
Overall then, it is not abnormal for interpretational differences relating to human rights 
treaties to remain unresolved. This leaves a significant space for contestation and argument at 
local, national, regional and international levels. If individual States are isolated in their 
interpretation it may be difficult for them to effectively and credibly maintain their views if there 
is an overwhelming consensus of States, regional and international human rights institutions and 
procedures against their interpretation. What is unusual in relation to sexual orientation 
discrimination is the very large number of States sharing the same interpretational differences. 
Ultimately, for it to be regarded as legally binding, international law requires the consent of 
States. Absent where they have accorded national or international human rights bodies the power 
to take binding legal decisions, State consent is clearly lacking in some regions in the realm of a 
prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination. 
 
7. Strategies for Managing the Differences on Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Between and Within States 
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If the preceding analysis and understanding are broadly correct as a matter of international law, 
attention needs to be focused on the question of what are the most appropriate legal and strategic 
responses to manage or bridge the very different and apparently rather polarized views of States 
on the issues.338  
 
(a) The complexity of State practice 
 
The first strategy is to focus on what unites States rather than divides them. The surveys of 
international and regional human rights practice in Parts 3-4 above and the national practices in 
Part 5 above are striking for their variety, diversity and complexity. The situation regarding 
sexual orientation issues has changed in Western Europe in recent decades but it has moved 
much further and faster than the rest of the world. The CoE is in the vanguard but even then 
some significant signs of opposition remain, particularly in States such as the Russian 
Federation, Moldova and the Ukraine. Within the scope of its competence the EU provides 
significant protection from sexual orientation discrimination. The OAS has seen minimal 
development but the IACtHR’s uncompromising judgment in the Atala case has brought the 
issue to the forefront. There is little evidence of development in the AU and next to none in 
ASEAN or the Arab League. It would be simplistic, however, to present the situation in States 
and regions as totally good in some and totally bad in others. Thinking in terms of regional 
blocks opposed to a norm on sexual orientation discrimination is also misleading. For example, it 
is clear both in Africa and in the ASEAN region that State practice is mixed and in a state of 
flux. Although a small number of African States have recently seen the introduction of stricter 
laws on homosexuality and a greater emphasis on enforcement, there is also a clear historic trend 
towards the decriminalisation of homosexuality. Moreover, it has to be remembered that it was 
only in 2014 that Europe itself become free of such laws. Similarly, discussion in terms or 
regional or traditional values or a singular idea of a family belies the historical and social 
complexity of societies and communities in all regions of the world.  
 
(b)  Waiting for Consensus – Affording States a Margin of Appreciation? 
 
                                                 
338 See also Altman and Symons, supra n 14, ch.6. 
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A UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights has argued that the UN cannot back off 
and wait until there is consensus among States or at least a broader acceptance that LGBT rights 
violations require a response.339 This is intriguing because, for the ECtHR, the existence of a 
consensus on an issue can be crucial in determining whether there is a violation and whether a 
State has remained within its margin of appreciation.340 Beginning with Dudgeon the ECtHR has 
looked for existence of consensus in the practice of the member States of the CoE.341 Some 45% 
of cases that refer to consensus relate to Article 8 ECHR issues.342 Almost all of the sexual 
orientation cases are in this category. Although the CoE is portrayed as being at the forefront in 
terms of sexual orientation discrimination, it is often forgotten that is has proceeded 
incrementally and by looking to the emergence of consensus. Even in a system with an 
underlying political consensus, a high level political body with responsibility to monitor the 
implementation of ECtHR judgments and which is supported by a strong Secretariat, it has still 
taken decades for State practice in all 47 Member States to fall in line with the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on the criminalisation of adult consensual same-sex relations.343 The practice of 
the UN human rights treaty bodies is not to look for consensus and not (at least explicitly) to 
afford States parties a margin of appreciation. Given the political sensitivity of the issues, the 
existence of a significant degree of legislative and judicial practice from States inconsistent with 
a prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination, accompanied by strong public opposition in 
many States and regions, one might at least question the long-term wisdom of that practice as it 
leaves a huge gap between the law and the practice.  
Another obvious difficulty in affording States a margin of appreciation (MOA) which 
can be affected by presence or absence of consensus are the much larger number of States 
concerned (168 parties to ICCPR as compared to 47 parties to ECHR) and the even greater 
massive disparities between them than between members of the Council of Europe. There is 
arguably a greater risk or likelihood that the MOA doctrine could be used more to confirm 
                                                 
339 Oslo Conference Report, supra n 6, at p. 39. 
340 See Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly, ‘No Consensus on Consensus’ (2013) 33 Human 
Rights Law Journal 248. 
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prevailing social norms than to challenge them,344 but that may be an inherent element of a 
universal system. 
Another possibility to consider is whether, even if sexual orientation is treated as within 
‘sex’ or ‘other status’, the requirement of ‘particularly serious or weighty reasons’ to justify 
differential treatment is setting the bar too high. The normal standard of ‘reasonable and 
objective’ reasons being sufficient to justify differential treatment might accommodate a broader 
range of genuine State and public concerns, while still generally encouraging States to raise their 
standards over time. It would also avoid the two extreme alternatives. Under the first States will 
continue to maintain that sexual orientation discrimination is not a human rights issue at all. 
Under the second, sexual orientation discrimination is accepted as a human rights issue but a 
large number of States take the view that such discrimination is justified for a broad range of 
traditional, cultural and religious reasons.345  
 
(c) Promoting dialogue rather than confrontation 
 
The UN Human Rights Council is an important political forum for the development of new 
thinking on human rights. However, tendencies toward politicisation along regional lines have 
been enhanced in relation to the issue of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity with voting 
patterns exposing major divisions. Repeating the resolutions just re-emphasizes the differences. 
So too when differences on sexual orientation issues impact on other resolutions on the 
protection of the family or traditional values.346 Diplomatic skills and cultural sensitivity suggest 
a need to focus on building cross-regional initiatives to curb the impression that sexual 
orientation rights is a ‘western’ conspiracy against non-western States. 347 To some extent this is 
already happening in the Human Rights Council as resolutions on sexual orientation are led by a 
group of South American States. If the EU as a block seeks to advance sexual orientation issues 
in resolutions it will meet resistance.  
                                                 
344 See Heinze, supra n 12, (2001) 289, n 32. He also observed that ‘If United Nations bodies 
should ever adopt such a doctrine, seeking favourable developments in a significant number of 
States before recognizing rights, sexual minorities will have a long wait’, at 290. 
345 See Moecki, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination’ in Moeckli et al, International Human Rights 
Law, 2nd edn (OUP, 2013) at 157-73. 
346 See supra Part 3(b). 
347 See Schlanbusch, ‘Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Rights in the Universal Periodic 
Review’ 57, MA Thesis, available at http://www.upr-info.org/IMG/pdf/schlanbusch_-
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By promoting a dialogic approach, the UPR process arguably offers an alternative to a 
confrontational and antagonistic process of attempting to enforce politically and legally 
controversial human rights norms.348 More generally the UPR process has ‘cast some light on 
the heterogeneity of States over the issue of decriminalisation of sexual orientation’ and, ‘gives 
an insight into the complex political terrain of the criminalisation of sexual orientation and 
facilitates the construction of a more nuanced understanding of the different issues involved in 
each case’.349 Its political and consensual nature provides a forum which encourages incremental 
reform with respect to specific aspects of sexual orientation discrimination, rather than rather 
artificially and unhelpfully dividing States into being either pro or anti sexual orientation 
discrimination as a human rights issue. But the process needs lots of patient diplomatic alliance 
building among like-minded States to work.350 It is not so helpful if UPR recommendations 
largely come from one regional grouping and are directed against one or two other regional 
grouping.351 
The UPR is ultimately a State-centric process. However, the tripartite reporting and the 
dialogic structure have provided advocates on sexual orientation issues with the opportunity to 
use the international space as an amplifier to get issues heard at both national and international 
levels.352 Reports from NGO and other national stakeholders have used the space to expose 
issues of sexual orientation discrimination. There has been a very large increase in SOGI-related 
content in submissions from civil society actors from the first UPR cycle compared to the 
second. The number of State sexual orientation recommendations has simultaneously increased 
as has the number of States willing to make them.353 As noted, so far States have not been 
willing to move on the fundamentals of their opposition by committing to decriminalization. 
However, decriminalization may require different strategies and stages depending on the legal 
system, degree of entrenchment and degree of constitutionality in any particular country.354 Thus 
decriminalization can be viewed as a process towards a goal of non-discrimination on grounds of 
                                                 
348 Cowell and Milon, supra n 72, 352. 
349 Ibid, 351-2. 
350 On the idea of ‘steward’ States acting to promote human rights see Hafner-Burton, Making 
Human Rights a Reality (Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 2013). 
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sexual orientation that is to be positively encouraged rather than an absolute indicator.355 From a 
practical perspective, achieving moratoriums (such as that in Malawi since 2012), non-
enforcement of criminal laws, restricting the scope of applicable offences and educating the 
public are all elements of the process towards decriminalisation. 
Moreover, some States have been more willing to respond more positively in terms of acting 
against violence based on sexual orientation and police violence, education, and impartial 
investigations.356 Bringing in aspects of public health,357 as some of the UN treaty bodies have 
done, may be a good strategic move.358 Even if some States have been opposed to considering 
sexual orientation issues in these terms, in the long term the impact of the health issues on the 
rest of the population may force them to do so. For example, one argument is that 
decriminalization of homosexuality would decrease the propagation of the HIV/ AIDS virus.359 
In September 2012, Commonwealth Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed with the recommendations 
of the Eminent Persons Group that there should be non-discriminatory access to treatment for 
HIV/AIDS and those discriminatory laws that impeded such access should be addressed.360 This 
is notable given that 41 Commonwealth member States still criminalize homosexuality.361 One 
positive element in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is the obligation to create a positive 
environment for persons suffering from communicable diseases, including HIV/AIDS.362 
 
(d) Economic Issues/ Aid 
 
When an issue is politically toxic between and within States it can be helpful to change the 
perspective and analyse the issue in terms of economic development, about which all States are 
interested. Thus there may be traction in presenting the case that protecting LGBT rights is 
                                                 
355 See Cowell, ‘Decriminalising Sexual Orientation: Three African States Compared’ available 
at http://www.polity.org.za/article/decriminalising-sexual-orientation-three-african-states-
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357 The World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (1977) listed 
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important to poverty reduction and that violations of human rights are likely to have a harmful 
effect on a State’s economy and development.363 Aid can be and is used to support an 
environment in which rights can be claimed on a non-discriminatory basis regardless of sexual 
orientation. In October 2011, during the Commonwealth Meeting of Heads of State, David 
Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, threatened to reduce development aid to countries that 
criminalised homosexuality. The United States has stated announced it would use all available 
mechanisms, including measures related to development cooperation, to promote the rights of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons.364 In February 2014, the World Bank postponed 
a US$90 million loan due to the signing Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act. The US cut aid, 
cancelled a military exercise and imposed visa bans on officials.365 Norway is withholding $8m 
in development aid to Uganda, and Denmark will divert $9m away from the Ugandan 
government.  
However, the risks of using aid as a human rights strategy on culturally sensitive issues are 
well known. Aid conditionality can undermine and harm local movements that are working hard 
to improve understandings of sexual orientation and gender identity in specific local contexts. 
Prime Minister Cameron’s statement resulted in an opposing statement signed by over 100 
African social justice activists from a considerable number of countries.366 The binary nature of 
the agenda can be limiting because of the narrow nature of the identities it asserts. There are the 
same general perceptions of imperialism, neo-colonialism and Western imposition of values. 
Conditionality of foreign aid only reinforces the argument that homosexuality is a Western 
construct.367 It has been argued that diplomatic ties of aid to ‘gay rights’ by western allies to 
African countries have perpetuated greater homophobia in Africa with ‘gays’ being viewed as 
                                                 
363 See Lee Badgett, The Relationship Between LGBT Inclusion and Economic Development (US 
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the stumbling block to access public welfare funding for health, education, shelter and other 
basic public amenities tied to western funding.368 Local tensions and intolerance toward 
perceived or actual sexual minorities are exacerbated when it is thought that aid is being 
withheld or redirected in order to ensure special treatment for the ‘LGBT’ movement.369 Tying 
aid to sexual rights can potentially result in the risk that aid towards education or healthcare, for 
example, will diminish. Governments can blame the withdrawal of foreign aid on ‘LGBT’ 
people, as happened in Malawi in 2011.370 The distinction is not always easy to make but it may 
be better to focus on aid which appears as a reward (a carrot) rather than the withdrawal of aid as 
a punishment (a stick).  
 
(e) Reporting and Awareness within international institutions 
 
The UN Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have both stated 
repeatedly that there is an urgent need to challenge homophobia at its roots – through public 
education, training and information on LGBT issues. 371 For a former UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, the first step in overcoming divisions among States was 
sustained and informed dialogue.372 But out of thousands of human rights-related reports 
presented to the GA and Human Rights Council over the years, just one – her own one-off report 
to the Council at the end of 2011,373 addressed homophobic violence and discrimination head-
on. The second, related gap was institutional. Information had been collected by existing human 
rights mechanisms, on an ad hoc basis. The only discussion among States was the 2012 one-off 
Panel debate.374 This fell far short of what was needed. Violence and discrimination against 
LGBT people was systematic; the response had to be too. In future, both reporting of these 
violations and discussion of State responses should be institutionalized and mainstreamed.  
 
(f) Domestic Jurisprudence on sexual orientation 
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On the basis of comparative domestic experience in Guatemala, Ghana, Nigeria, and South 
Korea, it has been submitted that a, ‘great deal of evidence suggests that the incremental 
approach might ultimately be a more expedient way to improve international gay rights’.375 
States are not institutionally monolithic and progress may be made from within States by 
strategic litigation and advocacy relying on domestic constitutional and legislative equality or 
non-discrimination provisions, sometimes with the use of international or transnational 
jurisprudence to assist progressive interpretations.376 Such domestic jurisprudence may carry a 
greater domestic legitimacy and authority than international jurisprudence. 
  
(g) Domestic NGOs and other civil society actors 
 
Human rights awareness can promote rights activism at the local national level.377 International 
human rights jurisprudence can be incorporated into domestic actors’ broader strategies to 
promote positive legal and policy changes and broaden societal understanding of a given 
issue.378 As with most human rights issues it is critical for advocates against sexual orientation 
discrimination that they are supported by the engagement of vibrant NGO and civil society 
actors and the space they occupy. Financial and human resources are almost always limited. The 
use of modern communication methods, particularly use of videos, films and images on the 
internet and contacts via social media, allows for NGOs and civil society actors to be established 
more easily and to communicate more effectively and efficiently.379 This would suggest that the 
strategy should be to focus more on non-governmental networks - academic, professional, civil 
society, and in particular to support local LGBT civil society groups and to encourage them to 
build alliances with other rights activists. These alliances should include national human rights 
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commissions, some of which have done excellent work on sexual orientation issues.380 This kind 
of solidarity is practically important because States continue to try to obstruct the establishment 
and operation of LGBT associations381 and impose more controls on NGOs, particularly on those 
with any foreign support or financing, and on civil society space.382  
 
(h) Changing Public Attitudes to Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
 
A Pew Survey in 2013, reported in The Global Divide on Homosexuality, also found huge 
variance between States and between different regions on the broader question of whether 
homosexuality should be accepted or rejected by society.383 Even within the same country 
attitudes towards sexual orientation discrimination are often very diverse. While education, 
dialogue and information are crucial, it has undoubtedly also been the case that national, regional 
and international legal prohibitions on race and sex discrimination have played an important part 
in developing and changing public attitudes on those issues.384 Quiet diplomacy and engagement 
have their place.385 Of course, laws can play a significant role in establishing and maintaining a 
social consensus. States sometimes need to lead debates on human rights issues by taking 
positions of principle, even if it can be argued that in doing so they are making an argument 
beyond the scope of existing law.  
Moreover, most States are complex and contain a range of institutional actors. It is not 
necessarily the case that the views of States in international forums reflect all of the major 
institutional actors within those States or public opinion within those States. However, the 
                                                 
380 State Sponsored Homophobia 2014, supra n 74, 85 citing those in Nepal, South Korea, and 
Thailand; Hafner-Burton, supra n 350, 164-75. 
381 See Eric Githari v. Non-Governmental Organisation Board and Others (Kenya High Court, 
2015) (the refusal of the NGO Coordination Board to register the National Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission was unlawful), available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/108412/; Rammage and 19 Others v Attorney –General, 
(CA, Bostwana) (refusal to register LGBT organisation was unlawful and violation of rights of 
assembly and association), available at 
http://www.humandignitytrust.org/uploaded/Library/Case_Law/Rammoge_and_ors_v_AG_Bots
wana_Judgment_2014-11-14.pdf. 
382 See Human Rights Council Resolution 27/31, ‘Civil Society Space’ (3 October 2014). 
383 Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Homosexuality-
Report-FINAL-JUNE-4-2013.pdf. See also the ILGA-RIWI 2016 Global Attitudes Survey on 
LGBTI People, available at http://ilga.org. 
384 On the dilemmas of changing LGBT laws, which can then generate a negative social and 
political response, or changing attitudes, see Mittelstaedt, supra n 3.  
385 For example, the leading LGBTI organisation in Samoa has been appointed a member of the 
new advisory board to the National Human Rights Institute. 
65 
 
significant divisions between States in those forums were reflected in the Pew Center survey, 
conducted in 39 countries among 37,653 respondents. Its Report found huge variance by region 
on the broader question of whether homosexuality should be accepted or rejected by society. 
There was widespread rejection in predominantly Muslim States and in Africa, as well as in 
parts of Asia and in Russia. The survey evidenced a strong relationship between a country’s 
religiosity and opinions about homosexuality. Acceptance of homosexuality was particularly 
widespread in countries where religion was less central in people’s lives. These are also among 
the richest countries in the world. There was far less acceptance of homosexuality in countries 
where religion was central to people’s lives.386 In poorer countries with high levels of religiosity, 
few believed homosexuality should be accepted by society. Age was also a factor in several 
countries, with younger respondents offering far more tolerant views than older ones.387 To the 
extent that this is accurate then views will simply evolve in a more tolerant direction over time. 
It would also suggest that encouraging debate and spreading information amongst younger 
persons is likely to have the greatest long term effect. While gender differences were not 
prevalent, in those countries where they were, women are consistently more accepting of 
homosexuality than men.  
To the extent that high religiosity tends to correlate with opposition to homosexuality it is 
important to emphasise that religions are not uniform or homogenous and are conscious of the 
risk of being out of step with evolving societal attitudes. The Pope’s Apostolic Exhortation, 
Amoris Laetitia in 2016 restated the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching that there were no 
grounds for considering ‘homosexual unions to be in any way similar or even remotely 
analogous to God’s plan for marriage and family’ but also reaffirmed that, ‘every person, 
regardless of sexual orientation, ought to be respected in his or her dignity and treated with 
consideration, while “every sign of unjust discrimination” is to be carefully avoided, particularly 
any form of aggression and violence.’388 Although The Holy See considers that the category of 
‘sexual orientation’ has no recognition or clear and agreed definition in international law,389 it 
has expressed opposition to legal discrimination and violence against homosexuals and to 
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criminal penalties being imposed on them. Along with many other States, it does not see 
opposition to gay marriage as inconsistent with that view.  
A focus on the domestic level also encourages engagement with the actions of influential 
‘veto-players’ in the political process, rather than by the assumption of a new societal or political 
consensus reflected in the legal reforms introduced.390 There is an obvious need for social and 
cultural changes and to identify and address social attitudes and prejudices. In Burma, for 
example, there is some evidence that repressive laws and abuses ‘in the shadow of the law’ are 
being relaxed but societal attitudes and prejudices remain as formidable obstacles.391 Thus 
attention needs to be focussed on the dismantling of stereotypes and social parameters related to 
sexual orientation.392 There is a strong argument that the increased individual and collective 
visibility of LGBT persons in all social, economic and cultural spheres is a crucial determinant 
of both societal change and State identity.393  
It is clearly the case, however, that there is far less agreement or consensus between States on 
sexual orientation discrimination in relation to same-sex issues concerning marriage, family life, 
adoption, sex education and the general education of children in relation to sexual orientation 
issues. It may seem trite but change in these areas is most likely to evolve as a result of more 
education and information. There is no doubt that the role of education in challenging and 
changing attitudes is fundamental. Protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation 
ultimately depends on societal attitudes, which are crucially linked to education, but also on the 
existence of adequate laws, policies and political will to implement them, which vary 
considerably even within the same country.394 Research which provides evidence that 
undermines entrenched societal and institutional attitudes to sexual orientation could have a long 
term impact, assuming that such research is credible.395 Social media is likely to play a critical 
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role at least to the extent that it can challenge State and religious controls on information and 
discussion.396  
 
8. Concluding Comments 
 
The struggle to achieve recognition for a human rights based prohibition on sexual orientation 
discrimination parallels those of developing other existing rights or gaining recognition for ‘new 
rights’.397 Women’s rights are also a universal problem with significant differences between 
States and their respective legal and cultural understandings of equality. But at least there is 
formal consensual acceptance of women’s rights and the accompanying institutional and 
procedural framework. No State argues that women’s human rights are not part of existing 
international human rights. What arguably distinguishes sexual orientation discrimination claims 
it has been the geographically widespread political and legal opposition. The UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon may consider that discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is ‘one 
of the great, neglected human rights challenges of our time’, but many States and their 
populations clearly do not. Even when there is a greater degree of acceptance of the problems, 
the issue is not seen a priority one. 
The legal debates on whether there are existing treaty prohibitions will doubtless 
continue. In the light of the continued opposition from a significant body of States, what is the 
way forward?398 The strategic and policy responses considered in Part 7 will shape the overall 
national, regional and international pictures, but they are complex and contested. Time, aided by 
the tolerance of younger persons on the issue, and the ubiquitous character of the internet and 
social media, may bring greater understanding and acceptance as they have with other grounds 
of non-discrimination such as race, sex, and more recently disability, but this in not inevitable.399  
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In the meantime, a final but important point to emphasize is that in many of the situations 
of violence, repression and exclusion considered in increasing number of reports on sexual 
orientation issues, from all regions of the world, sexual orientation may be relevant in terms of 
motivation or aggravation, but there would be a human rights violation in any event.400 LGBT 
persons have human rights irrespective of the status of their right to be free from sexual 
orientation discrimination.  
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